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DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGRAPHICS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF A CLASS-BOUND
INTERPRETATION
Dan Rosen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"[T] he values judges are likely to single out as fundamental, to the
extent that the selections do not simply reflect the political and ethical
predispositions of the individuals concerned, are likely to have the smell
of the lamp about them."'
John Hart Ely and other commentators have turned up their noses
at the smell of the lamp in various theories of judicial review. The institution of review is not what offends them. That much is accepted 181
years after Marbury v. Madison. Rather, what worries the critics of
noninterpretivism is the set of values judges bring to the task.8
Ultimately, nine persons-until recently nine men-impose their
judgment of the Constitution on the public, often contradicting the conclusions of a popularly elected Congress. Without some objective criterion of constitutionality, critics say, the justices are left with little to
rely on but their own intuition. That intuition is based on socialization,
and the socialization of the justices is for the most part that of the elite.
To counter this class-bound interpretation, commentators have devised a plethora of approaches. J. B. Thayer promoted the clear mistake doctrine.' Herbert Wechsler advanced a theory of neutral principles.' Raoul Berger argues for fidelity to the text.' Robert Bork looks to
*Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University (New Orleans). B.A., Trinity University
(1974), B.A., Trinity University (1975); M.A., University of Texas (1976); J.D., Southern Methodist University School of Law (1982); LL.M., Yale Law School (1983). Member of the District
of Columbia and Texas Bars. I wish to thank Judge Robert Bork of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and Professor Leopold Pospisil of Yale University, for their
comments during the preparation of this article. Of course, the opinions expressed herein are
solely those of the author.
1. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 59 (1980).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See generally Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983). This article is primarily concerned with review by the Supreme Court,
as it holds the ultimate judicial power. The arguments made herein, however, apply to all courts.
4. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129 (1893). See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
5. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1959), reprinted in H.

WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW

3 (1961).

See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
6. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESS];
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the intention of the Framers.7 John Hart Ely finds the procedural provisions of the Constitution elementary.'
Judicial activists, too, have participated in the search for justification. Ronald Dworkin 9 and Harry Wellington rely on principles of our

society.10 Alexander Bickel looked forward to principles that would
adjudigain general assent."' Paul Brest concludes that constitutional
2
cation is based on furthering fundamental values.1
Across the spectrum, then, most commentators insist that Supreme
Court justices have some external referent for reaching their conclusions. They generally deny the allegation that members of the Court
will rely on their own values-those of highly educated, high status,
often high income individuals-in overriding the will of the majority.
The fear, says Robert Bork, is that the Constitution will become
gentrified:
The constitutional culture-those who are most intimately involved with
constitutional adjudication and how it is perceived by the public at large:
federal judges, law professors, members of the media-is not composed
of a cross-section of America, either politically, socially, or morally. If,
as I have suggested, noninterpretivism leads a judge to find constitutional
values within himself, or in the values of those with whom he is most
intimately associated, then the values which might loosely be described
as characteristic of the university-educated upper middle class will be
those that are imposed.'
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT]. See infra
notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
7. Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695 [hereinafter cited as Welfare Rights]; Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as First Amendment].
See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
8. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 73-104. Those who enjoy the search for antecedents can find the
seeds of Ely's book in a number of his earlier articles including Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:
Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing
Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978); and Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978). See infra
notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
9. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981). See generally R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

82-100 (1977).

10. Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rules]; Wellington, The Nature of
JudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Nature]. See infra notes 105-24
and accompanying text.

11.

A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

239 (1962). See infra notes 132-41 and

accompanying text.
12. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Quest]. See also Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictionsof Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Rights]. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
13. Bork, The Struggle over the Role of the Court, NAT'L REV. 1137-38 (1982).
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Bork points the accusing finger at those who look outside the Constitution and the history of its time for their understanding, and it
probably is the case that those who are willing to consider a broader
range of evidence have more opportunity to inject their personal views
into the analysis. Nevertheless, " '[s]trict' constructionism is today as
dead as Cato the Elder," 1 ' and any judge who engages in anything
more than a mechanical jurisprudence is susceptible to the charge of
self-assertion. Indeed, reflecting oneself in adjudication may be
unavoidable.
The hypothesis of this article is first, that no matter what mode of
analysis a judge uses, the substantive conclusion reached will tend to
express the judge's predilections; and second, to the extent that members of the Supreme Court have similar backgrounds, their collective
decisions will tend to support the views of the elite groups from which
they come.
To date, the elitism hypothesis has been based on supposition. The
purpose of this article is to examine it empirically. Using public opinion
data collected by the National Opinion Research Center in its General
Social Surveys,"' a variety of controversial Court decisions will be compared to public attitudes toward those issues. If the elitism hypothesis
is true, the decisions should mirror those of higher occupational status,
education, class, and income. Initially, though, some psychological and
sociological studies of attitude formation and expression will be reviewed, as will the theme of elitism in the literature on judicial review.
If elitism is found in the actions of the Supreme Court, the justification
of the Court's role will become that much more important.
II. THE SOCIAL SELF AND THE SUPREME COURT

Justices of the Supreme Court operate at the pinnacle of political
14. Charles Black writes, though, that strict constructionism's "image is still carried in pa-

rades on ritual occasion." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 71 (1960). But cf. Van Al-

styne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 225 (1983) (Justice Robert's statement in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936), that the duty-of the Court is to lay the Constitution beside the
statute to see if they square may accurately capture the interest in accuracy most people would
hope for from the Supreme Court). See also Saphire, Constitutional Theory in Perspective: A
Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1435 (1984).
15. The General Social Surveys have collected public opinion on a wide variety of issues
since 1972. Each survey is an independently drawn sample of English-speaking persons, 18 years
old or older, living in noninstitutional arrangements within the continental United States. Approximately 1,500 people were questioned in each of the surveys. The data are available on tape for
computer analysis from National Opinion Research Center, 6030 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill.
60637. A codebook containing the questions and technical information is available from the same
source. by eCommons, 1984
Published
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power in America.1 6 Nine persons preside over one coequal branch of
government,1 7 enjoying positions regarded as highly prestigious in the
public mind.18 They are truly members of the elite.
For most members of the Court, high status is nothing new. Socially, educationally, and occupationally, the justices, for the most part,
have operated in similar circles for years prior to their appointment.
They are recruited from a ladder of ever-increasing elitism. All are
lawyers, which in itself places them in the upper echelon of society. 19
They are hardly run-of-the-mill attorneys, however.
A review of the current justices' careers illustrates the point. Justice Blackmun had served as counsel to the Mayo Clinic and on the
bench of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 Chief Justice Burger
was elevated from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.' Justice Brennan came from the New Jersey Supreme
Court. 2 Justice Marshall, the member with the least typical background, nevertheless operated at high levels before his appointment,
both as a judge in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and as solicitor
general.' Justice O'Connor, a former appellate judge in Arizona, had
also served as a state legislator and Republican party activist." Justice
Powell had been president of the American Bar Association and American College of Trial Lawyers.' Justice Rehnquist worked as a high

16.

The Court, according to Harold Lasswell, is at the top of the "deference pyramid." H.

LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How 13-14 (1936).

17. Only the executive branch concentrates more power in the hands of fewer individuals, a
fact that prompted debate at the constitutional convention over whether the executive should consist of more than one person. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 88,
97 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (Madison's records of June 2 and June 4, 1787).
18. The number of people expressing great confidence in the Supreme Court significantly
exceeds that expressing similar trust in Congress and the executive branch. In a 1982 survey, 30%
of the people responded in this manner about the Supreme Court compared with 13% for Con-

gress and 19% for the executive branch.

GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS,

1972-1982:

CUMULATIVE

CODEBOOK 112, 114 (J. Davis principal investigator 1982) (question 126) [hereinafter cited as
GSS]. Although somewhat dated now, a 1961 book found Supreme Court justices to be rated as
having the highest prestige among government officials, excluding the president. A. REISS, OCCUPATIONS AND SOCIAL STATUS

73 (1961).

19. Only physicians and college teachers exceed lawyers and judges in prestige. See GSS,
supra note 18, at 299-311 (appendix F). The method of computing the prestige scores is explained in P. Siegel, Prestige in the American Occupational Structure (March 1971) (unpublished
dissertation in the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago). See generally A. REISS,
supra note 18; Hope, A Liberal Theory of Prestige, 87 Am. J. Soc. 1011 (1982).
20. GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 864 (1979).
21. Id. at 71.
22. Id. at 859.
23. Id. at 863.

24.

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAW

521 (1983).

25. GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 20, at 865.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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official in the Justice Department.2 6 Justice Stevens was elevated from
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.17 Justice White, too, had served
at high levels of the Justice Department and had been active in John
Kennedy's presidential campaign.28 Educationally, the most elite
schools-Yale, Harvard, and Stanford-dominate the dossiers of the
justices.2 1
Politically, too, members of the Supreme Court tend to have operated within the inner circles. They were not simply people licking envelopes at campaign headquarters. Judge Edward Devitt of the United
States District Court in Minnesota once confessed that in order to become a federal judge, "you've got to know a senator." 0 Through their
previous careers, members of the Supreme Court became acquainted
with senators and presidents.
The selection process, doubtless, is aimed at recruiting the best,
wisest, and most experienced legal minds. Thus, it is elitist by definition. Senator Roman Hruska may have done as much as anyone to kill
the confirmation of G. Harrold Carswell by his defense of the judge:
"There are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers, and they
are entitled to a little representation, aren't they?" 1 The nation wants
the best and the brightest, but what it wants them to do is another
question.
C. Wright Mills, in The Power Elite, described the effect of class
socialization on attitude formation. Mills wrote that people's morality
and psychology are determined by the values they experience and the
institutional roles they are allowed, and expected, to play. The values
and experiences of the upper class, he said, are formed by relationships
with other similar persons in small groups. 2 The higher they rise, the
more they tend to maintain connections with others in the upper
class.83 Moreover, they are much more unified and thus more powerful
than those at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy.84

26. Id.
27. Id. at 866.
28. Id. at 861.
29. Id. at 859-66.
30. Speech by Judge Edward J. Devitt, Southern Methodist University School of Law (Nov.
11, 1981).
31. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 75 (1979).
32. C.W. MILLS, THE POWER EJTE 15 (1956).
33. Id. at 279. Indeed, their very rising quite likely depends on having been socialized by
the previous generation of leaders and selected because of their acceptance of this socialization.
See A. STINCHOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 109-10 (1968).
34. C.W. MILLS, supra note 32, at 29. "[T]he bottom [of the American system of power],"
Mills wrote, "is much more fragmented, and in truth, impotent, than is generally supposed by
those who are distracted by the middling units of power which neither express such will as exists
at the bottom
nor determine
the decisions at the top." Id. See also G. DomHoFP, THE HIGHER
Published
by eCommons,
1984
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One can barely fantasize about, let alone expect to see, any member of the Court heading toward Bedford-Stuyvesant or South Boston
to discuss the economy. Some may be significantly more sympathetic
than others to the concerns of the people who live there, but they cannot be empathetic because they are not a part of that culture. A justice's working hours are spent with the other justices and law clerks,
who themselves tend to be products of elite society. The social life of a
justice likely centers on official Washington and people known before
coming to the Court-generally other members of the elite. The justices are insulated by appointment from political pressure; thus even if
they were to expand their circle of acquaintances, it would be unrealis5
tic to expect a change in the predispositions built up over a lifetime,"
especially at the time of life in which most people are appointed to the
Court.
The idea of the social self is not new. If anything, it is one of the
most widely accepted concepts in sociology and psychology. William
James wrote about it as early as 1890.36 George Herbert Mead elaborated on the concept in the 1930's,87 and Charles Cooley continued the
line of inquiry in the mid-sixties."' Theorists such as Carl Hovland and
Muzafer Sherif found the influence of group identification to be a powerful determinant of an individual's attitudes.3 9 Even historians such as
Isaiah Berlin have affirmed the role of the social environment in shaping action.40 Accordingly, while nothing in social science is certain,
very little disagreement exists about the proposition that "[ifn moving
from one group to another an individual generally brings with him certain inclinations, sentiments, [and] attitudes that he has acquired in the
group from which he comes.""'

(1970); G. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA?
(1967). But see R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,
CIRCLES: THE GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA

52 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 463 (1958).
35. C.W. MILLS, supra note 32, at 284. Stanley Coppersmith has written that once the idea
of self has been established, "it apparently provides a sense of personal continuity over space and
time, and is defended against alteration, diminution, and insult." S. COPPERSMITH, THE ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-ESTEEM 21 (1967).
36. W. JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890).
37. G. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934). See also H. DUNCAN, COMMUNICATION
AND SOCIAL ORDER 73 (1962).
38. C. COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1964). The work of James,
Mead, Cooley, and Coppersmith on this subject is summarized in J. CARDWELL, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 77-95 (1971).
39. See. e.g., C. HOVLAND, I. JAN1S & H. KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION
(1953); M. SHERIF & C. HOVLAND, SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1961). See generally A. COHEN, ATriTUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 106-07 (1964).
40. 1. BERLIN, HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY 35-36 (1954), quoted in Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CM. L. REV. 661, 670 (1960).
41. V. PARETO, THE MIND & SOCIETY § 2041 (A. Bongiorno & A. Livingston trans., A.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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The social self, then, is formed by the interaction of persons with
others around them. One who attended prep school, an Ivy League college, and an elite law school, one who worked for a large law firm or in
the upper echelons of the government, one who served as a judge in a
federal court of appeals, is thus molded in a highly compact crucible.
The attitudes of these groups will influence such persons throughout
the rest of their lives. Placed in situations requiring a decision, they
necessarily consider how these groups would respond to various options,
for they know themselves primarily through the reactions of others to
them.42 The more important the group to them, the more persuasive its
perceived reaction will be. The more homogeneous the groups in their
backgrounds, the less likely they are to diverge from their preconceived
attitudes.
Language, too, is a reflection of the social self. Words take on
meaning by virtue of their use. Through trial and error, individuals settle upon some meaning for the symbols they use to represent reality. 3
As a result, the symbols may be laden with different meanings to different people. For the most part, disagreement over meaning is reduced
as specificity increases. That is, the meaning of "carbon dioxide" is relatively stable, but less agreement is likely about the meaning of a more
abstract term such as "unreasonable" in the fourth amendment.
Whether determining the meaning of language or fundamental
principles of justice:

Livingston ed. 1935). See also R. LANE & D. SEARS, PUBLIC OPINION 41 (1964).
42. J. CARDWELL, supra note 38, at 81. Members of the Court may well share many values
of legal academics, as it is that group that reacts to judicial decisions in law reviews and other
publications the justices are likely to read or at least consult. Academics, on the whole, have a
particular left-of-center political orientation, one that is so pronounced that Andrew Greeley was
moved to describe them as a distinct ethnic group or subculture in society. Greeley, Intellectuals
as an Ethnic Group, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 22. Seymour Martin Lipset
has spent a good part of his career documenting the political values of professors and is convinced
of the breadth and depth of their "liberal" orientation. See, e.g., Lipset, The Academic Mind at
the Top: The Political Behavior and Values of Faculty Elites, 46 PUB. OPINION Q. 143 (1982);
Lipset, American Intellectuals: Their Politics and Status, 88 DAEDALUS 460 (1959); Lipset &
Dobson, The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and
Soviet Union, DAEDALUS, Summer 1972, at 137; Lipset & Ladd, The Politics of American Sociologists, 78 AM. J. Soc. 67 (July 1972). But see S. LANG, THE FILE (1981) (questioning the
methodology of Lipset's faculty surveys).
43. See J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 181 (1922); H. DUNCAN, supra note 37, at
59. The special case of the language of the law is discussed in Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149 (1981), as well as in two accompanying comments: Peters, Reality and
the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193 (1981); Shapiro, On The Regrettable Decline of
Law French: Or Shapiro Jettet Le Brickbat, 90 YALE L.J. 1198 (1981). The use of literary criticism methods in constitutional analysis has fostered a lively debate. See generally Law and Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373-586 (1982), in which a multitude of commentators argues about the
proper use,
any, of such 1984
techniques.
Published
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[A]l1 of us face new stimulus situations with certain modes or standards

or frames of reference which have been built up within the context of a
social group. And, in fact, such established social norms as stereotypes,
fashions, fads, and customs are all partly the product of shared frames of
references built up through contact between individuals. Once such
norms are established, they determine the way in which people will face
subsequent situations-social and nonsocial alike."
All this is not to say that Supreme Court justices are held prisoner
in a small ideological cell built by their life's associations. In fact, upon
assuming the bench they assume a new role which carries its own definition. 45 They may well conclude that the role of a Supreme Court justice is to cast off all vestiges of predisposition, and decide each case on
a detached rational basis. In effect, they may determine that the expectation of influential people in their lives is that they should not allow
their personal views to interfere with their judgments. They may, in
fact, achieve some success in separating their overt personal views from
the case at hand. Ultimately, however, their process of rationalization
will reflect their socialization.
It would be too crude to say that the justices will decide what is an
unreasonable search based on the views of the constitutional law
faculty at their alma mater or of their classmates whose dorm room
was searched in college. Eventually, though, the self will be expressed-perhaps as they begin to think of other examples of unreasonableness. They are, after all, lawyers, and lawyers attach a much different meaning to that term than does the lay public. Perhaps it will arise
when they try to decide what the Framers meant by unreasonable.
What method of analysis should be used? Should only official statements be considered or secondary material as well? What importance
should be placed on documents such as the Federalist Papers? How
should relevance or irrelevance be decided? Why use the historical
method? Perhaps a psychological profile of the authors would be more
revealing. Do they decide not to pursue a particular avenue of inquiry
because they lack the appropriate research skills? Is such a method of
analysis the way most judges approach the material? Do they think
that psychology is not able to reveal that kind of truth? Why do they
have that attitude? No, the justices are not confined to a small cell, but
they do live in houses constructed with the help of others. They may
roam from room to room, but they rarely leave home.
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated the relationship of
higher status and class to attitudes, many of the studies using data

44.

A. COHEN, supra note 39, at 108.

45. J. CARDWELL, supra note 38, at 88-91.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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from the General Social Surveys (GSS). Davis, the principal investigator for the GSS, found a persistent correlation between education and
opinion.4 6 Glenn and Weaver discovered that people with greater education have more permissive attitudes toward sex."7 Grabb concluded
that workers were less willing to tolerate the expression of unpopular
views because of lower education and income as well as greater anomie. 48 Sengstock found that those with higher status and income were
more supportive of decriminalizing pornography, allowing homosexuals
to teach in colleges, and legalizing abortion.4 9 Section IV of this article
will examine similar data to determine the extent to which the justices'
decisions mirror the attitudes of the elite, and diverge from those of the
general public.
The difference between the justices' backgrounds and those of the
general public would not be significant except that the attitudes produced by those backgrounds affect everyone. Unlike most citizens, the
views of the justices have society-wide importance. As C. Wright Mills
wrote, "The ends of men are often merely hopes, but means are facts
within some men's control."' 0 So it is with the Supreme Court. If the
goals of the Court are out of step with those of society, serious consequences can result. The consequences may be justified, and indeed in
the long run society may come to accept the justices' decisions. Nevertheless, the danger is that of public alienation, disrespect, 1 and disobedience. Cardozo wrote that judges are the living oracles, who must de-

46. Davis, Background Variables and Opinions in the 1972-1977 NORC General Social
Surveys: Ten Generalizations about Age, Education, Occupational Prestige, Race. Religion, and
Sex, and Forty-Nine Opinion Items (General Social Survey Technical Report No. 18, Aug. 1978,
obtainable from NORC, 6030 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill.
60637).
47. Glenn & Weaver, Attitudes toward Premarital, Extra-Marital, and Homosexual Relations in the United States in the 1970's, 15 J. SEx RESEARCH 108 (1979).
48. Grabb, Working-Class Authoritarianism and Tolerance of Outgroups: A Reassessment, 43 PUB. OPINION Q. 36 (1979).
49. Sengstock, Traditional Versus Zero-Base Morality as a Basis for Law (Aug. 1979)
(presented to the American Sociological Ass'n, Boston, Mass.).
50. C.W. MILLS, supra note 32, at 23.
51. Finley Peter Dunne popularized a form of this disrespect for courts in the early part of
the twentieth century through the personality of Mr. Dooley, a fictional bartender about whom he
wrote in a long series of essays. In one typical barb at the appellate process, Dooley said, "Th'
on'y wan that bows to th' decision is th' fellow that won, an' pretty soon he sees he's made a
mistake, f'r wan day th' other coort comes out an declares that th' decision iv th' lower coort is
another argymint in favor iv abolishing night law schools." F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY SAYS 158-67
(1910) (essay entitled "The Big Fine"). See E. BANDER, MR. DOOLEY AND MR. DUNNE: THE
LITERARY LIFE OF A CHICAGO CATHOLIC 252-53 (1981); Sloane, Book Review, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 748 (1982).
Mr. Dooley is perhaps best known for his contention that "no matter whether th' constitution
follows th' flag or not, th' Supreme Coort follows th' election returns." F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S
OPINIONS 21-26 (1901) (essay entitled "The Supreme Court Decisions"). See E. BANDER, supra,
at 201.byThe
empirical response
Published
eCommons,
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cide in all cases of doubt.5 That may be so, but the Court should take
care that it does not suffer the fate of the oracles of an earlier age, who
died of desuetude. s
III.

STATUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Implicit in the debate over what is called the Madisonian dilemma-the appointed Supreme Court overturning laws passed by the
elected Congress-is the notion that the values of the Court will be
different from those of the people. As has been shown in section II of
this article, that proposition is quite likely to be true. Moreover, the
justices are quite likely to inject the values of their backgrounds into
their decisions, try as they may to avoid doing so.
For this reason, a variety of theories have been proposed to limit
the effect of this elitism. The line commonly is drawn between interpretivists and noninterpretivists," yet for the purpose of this discussion
that is not the crucial distinction. Although the two groups differ in the
sources on which they rely for constitutional decisions, most agree that
some constraints ought to be placed on the justices. The main disagreement concerns the proper constraints.
In this regard the commentators on judicial review are more profitably viewed along a continuum rather than in two distinct categories.
Raoul Berger and Alexander Bickel may disagree over whether the justices should be bound to the original intention of the Framers, but they
share the idea that members of the Court should not base their decisions simply on their own values.15 Some may disagree over the proper
52. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19 (1921).
53. See J. JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BICAMERAL MIND 321-31 (1976).
54. Michael Perry explains the difference as follows:
The Supreme Court engages in interpretive review when it ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the value judgments embodied, though
not necessarily explicitly, either in some particular provision of the text of the Constitution
or in the overall structure of government ordained by the Constitution. . . .[T] he effort is
to ascertain, as accurately as available historical materials will permit, the character of a
value judgment the Framers constitutionalized at some point in the past. The Court engages in noninterpretive review when it makes the determination of constitutionality by
reference to a value judgment other than one constitutionalized by the Framers.
Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification,56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 278, 279 (1981) (footnote omitted). But cf. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022-23 (1984) (constitutional law involves rare periods of
constitutional politics, in which appeals to common good are made, and normal politics, in which
factions manipulate political life to serve their own interests). For still another different, and most
elegant description of the tension, see Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REv.
4 (1983) (constitutionalism legitimizes communities and movements in context of a normative
world of right and wrong).
55. John Hart Ely notes that few people forthrightly argue that judges should impose their
own values as a source of constitutional judgment. "Instead," he says, "the search purports to be
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4

1984]

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

placement of each of these commentators, but I view them across a
spectrum: Thayer > Berger > Hand > Bork > Ely > Wechsler >
Dworkin > Wellington > Perry > Bickel > Cox > Tribe > Black
> Brest. A critique of the views of most of these scholars follows, detailing the role of the justice in their respective theories.
J. B. Thayer could rightfully be considered the progenitor of the
scholarly debate over judicial review. In 1893 he published The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,5 6 setting
out the case for extreme restraint by the Court. The "clear mistake"
doctrine is Thayer's contribution to the jargon. Courts must respect the
function of the elected branches of government, Thayer argued. Thus,
he said, the Court should stay its hand when Congress has made a
simple mistake. Only when the mistake was "very clear . . . so clear
that it is not open to rational question ' 57 should the Court strike it
down as unconstitutional.
Thayer's approach was to remove as much subjectivity as possible
from the Court's decision making, thus allowing the national legislature
as much latitude as possible. Nevertheless, on its own terms, Thayer's
test involves the justices' subjective judgment of rationality. One person's simple mistake is another person's irrational error. Presumably,
justices would view as most egregious those mistakes that interfere
most severely with the rights which they consider fundamental. Thayer
does not give the justices any objective criterion for making this
decision.
Even Ely, who would allow a wider scope of judicial discretion,
attacks "reason," in a different context, as being undeniably classbased:
The danger that upper-middle-class judges and commentators will find
upper-middle-class-values fundamental . . . [is] exacerbated when 'reason' is the supposed value source . . . partly because the values . . . are
the values of the 'reasoning class,' and partly because 'reason,' being inherently an empty source, may lend itself unusually well to being filled in

objective and value-neutral; the reference is to something 'out there' waiting to be discovered,
whether it be natural law or some supposed value consensus of historical America, today's
America, or the America that is yet to be." J. ELY, supra note 1, at 48. Cf. Bennett, Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 496 (1984) (constraint on judges is not outside
governance, e.g., original intention of constitutional framers, but rather the internal process of
engaging in decision making in the judicial environment).
56. Thayer, supra note 4.
57. Id. at 144. Thayer based this approach on the rule of administration adopted by many
states and referred to approvingly as early as 1796 by Justice Chase of the United States Supreme
Court. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171, 175 (1796) (Chase, J.); Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S.by
(3 eCommons,
DalI.) 199, 237
(1796) (Chase, J.).
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by the values of one's own kind."

Similarly, Felix Cohen criticized Thayer's clear mistake doctrine as
transforming the courts into "lunacy commissions sitting in judgment
upon the mental capacity of legislators." 5'9
Nevertheless, the rationality approach has persisted in constitutional law, at least insofar as footnote four of Carolene Products" did
not anticipate a more searching review. Some statutes are judged on a
rationality basis." Others are subjected to strict scrutiny, and the
Court has spent much of its time deciding which cases will be governed
by which test.6 9 The answer turns on the justices' concept of fundamental rights. As a result, the application of "rational" judicial review only
changes the point at which subjectivity enters the decision-making

calculus.
Judge Learned Hand appreciated the pure version of Thayer's jurisprudence. Hand believed constitutional adjudication was a matter of
preserving the separation of powers. The Court, he cautioned, should
not act as a third legislative chamber, although he conceded that it had

58. J.ELY, supra note 1, at 59 n.**.
59. THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE-SELECTED PAPERS OF FEux S. COHEN 44 (L. Cohen ed.
1960).
60. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted)
reads as follows:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts these political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation ...
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities . . .whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
61. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory
retirement age); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (grandfather clause for
vendors); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (regulation of opticians).
62. One of the most controversial areas in which the Court has engaged in simple rationality review is that of Sunday closing legislation. Although religion, a first amendment right, is
involved, the Court has sustained local closing laws on the ground that they advance the valid
secular purpose of a uniform day of rest. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). See generally Kushner, Toward the
Central Meaning of Religious Liberty: Non-Sunday Sabbatarians and the Sunday Closing Cases
Revisited, 35 Sw. L.J. 557 (1981).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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done so.03
Hand acknowledged that judges were likely to express the views of
their social class rather than those of the whole community." Yet he
publicly deplored the specter of an elite group of highly educated and
intelligent justices overriding the popular will expressed by the legislature. Hand wrote:
For myself, it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.
If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society
where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public
affairs. Of course, I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote
determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a
satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture."
As Bickel points out, Hand's prescription of restraint is tantamount to abstinence. 6 The more telling criticism, however, is that in
denying the judge a subjective role he has assumed one himself. Based
on history, Hand distinguished frontier separation of powers sections of
the Constitution from the Bill of Rights. 7 The former was to be the
proper domain of the Court. The latter, if balanced against a statute by
the Court, only served to second-guess the Congress. Most others, even
those of an interpretivist bent, read history differently and find an important judicial role in enforcing the Bill of Rights."
More recently, Raoul Berger has carried the standard for severe
judicial restraint, practicing what Brest describes as strict intentional0 Berger
ism. 9 In Government by Judiciary,"
assembles his case against
63. Hand wrote:
I cannot frame any definition that will explain when the Court will assume the role of a
third legislative chamber and when it will limit its authority to keeping Congress and the
states within their accredited authority. Nevertheless, I am quite clear that it has not abdicated its former function, as to which I hope that it may be regarded as permissible for me
to say that I have never been able to understand on what basis it does or can rest except as
a coup de main.
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 (1958).
64. L. HAND, THE SPIT OF LIBERTY 203 (1. Dillard ed. 1952).
65. L. HAND, supra note 63, at 73-74. To this, Ronald Dworkin replies, "hyperbole." The
Court has a role in the balance of government, and "[a]cademic lawyers do no service by trying to
disguise the political decisions this balance assigns to judges. Rule by academic priests guarding
the myth of some canonical original intention is no better than the rule by Platonic guardians in
different robes." Dworkin, supra note 9, at 518.
66. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 48.
67. L. HAND, supra note 63, at 66-67.
68. The argument generally is over the breadth of the right protected. Compare Bork, First
Amendment, supra note 7 (political speech is principal value protected by first amendment) with
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982) (first amendment protects selfrealization).
69.by Brest,
Quest, supra
Published
eCommons,
1984note 12, at 222-24.
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judicial activism by showing that it may destroy values as easily as it
creates them. In a chapter entitled "The Turnabout of the Libertarians," 7 1 Berger traces the change of sentiment of those who berated the
72
Court for imposing its own laissez-faire economic attitudes on the nation in the 1930's and 1940's, and later defended it for pursuing the
same course with "libertarian" values during the Warren era.7 3
What had changed, according to Berger, was not the approach of
the justices but their values. To support this proposition, he offered the
testimony of Archibald Cox, a witness who was hostile to his beliefs:
By the 1950's the political atmosphere had changed. The legislative process, even at its best, became resistant to libertarian, humanitarian, and
egalitarian impulse[s]. . . . [T]hese impulses were not shared so
strongly and widely as to realize themselves through legislation. They
came to be felt after the early 1950's by a majority of the Supreme
Court Justices, . . . perhaps because the impulses were felt more
7
strongly in the world of the highly educated. '
The world of the highly
which Raoul Berger belongs,
the Constitution. Like Hand,
others,'7 6 Berger insists upon

educated is a good one. It is the one to
but it is not the one he wishes to control
who decried "Platonic Guardians,"7 5 and
majority rule. Majoritarianism is funda-

70. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 6.
71. Id. at 312.
72. See generally B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME
TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942).

73. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 6, at 312. Paul Freund disputes the contention
that the Warren Court was nothing more than a Taft Court of the left. "[Tihe comparison is
unfair." he says, "because a concern with the framework of participation, with structure and
process, is a judicial function far more legitimate than the Taft Court's disagreement with the
legislative outcomes of that process, whether they be minimum-wage or price-control or childlabor laws." Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 493, 497.
74. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 35 (1976).
75. See supra text accompanying note 65.
76. Berger quotes McDougal and Lans: "Government by a self-designated elite-like that
of a benevolent despotism or [of] Plato's philosopher kings-may be a good form of government
for some [peoples], but it is not the American way." R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 6, at
314. The citation Berger provides is McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive
or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
577-78 (1945). The quotation actually appears in the second part of the article, which appeared
in a later issue of the journal. The correct citation is McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPolicy: 11,
54 YALE L.J. 534, 578 (1945).
The more serious problem is that Berger takes McDougal and Lans out of context, giving the
impression that they might prefer a restrictive approach to judicial review. In fact, they do not. In
the passage Berger quotes, they are discussing the blocking of treaties by one-third of the Senate.
A quotation from the first part of their article shows that their opinion on judicial review hardly
resembles the opinion of Raoul Berger:
Each generation of citizens must in a very real sense interpret the words of the Framers to
create its own constitution. The more conscious the interpreters are that this is what they
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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mental to Berger, even though the majority often contradicts the highly
educated class to which he belongs. No intellectual, he says, can help
but be disappointed by the vox populi from time to time.7 Nevertheless, he places his trust, as did Lincoln, in "the ultimate good sense of
78
the people."
Berger, then, bases his theory on majoritarianism, yet in choosing
his majority he displayed his own subjectivity. The Framers of the
Constitution certainly can be said to have expressed the will of the majority at that time; however, can the same be said for their expression
of the will of today's majority? This is the critique John Ely applies
against Berger, Bork, and others of their ilk.7 9 By looking backward for
guidance, they shun contemporary conceptions of the Constitution. s° If
democracy is their principal concern, why the democracy of the eighteenth century? Is that not antimajoritarian in itself?
A likely explanation for Berger's intentionalism is subjective-his
preference for stability. Moreover, his search for the original intention
is destined to involve subjective interpretation. Like the rationality approach, it simply puts the subjective evaluation at a different place.
Instead of deciding whether a right exists, Berger asks whether the
Framers thought it existed and uses his own faculties to evaluate the
historical data. Others, such as Brest, criticize him for ignoring the
possibility that the authors may not have wished future generations to
be bound by their understanding." The likely result of Berger's approach, according to Brest, is more subjectivity though "arbitrary manipulation of sources and outcomes." '
are doing the more likely it is that their interpretations will embody the best long-term
interests of the nation. In truth, our very survival as a nation has been made possible only
because the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution . . . have repeatedly transcended the
restrictive interpretations of their predecessors.
McDougal & Lans: Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Inter-

changeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 215 (1945).
77. Berger offers the election of Richard Nixon as president as an example. R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 6, at 314.
78.
79.

Id.
J. ELY, supra note 1, at 11. Ely notes that both Noah Webster and Thomas Jefferson

worried about this "dead hand" control. See G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBuc 1776-1787, at 379 (1969); 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 116, 121 (P. Ford ed.
1895).
80. Henry Monaghan's response to this criticism is, in effect, tell it to Congress. The Constitution and the original intent surrounding it are the proper guides for constitutional meaning, he
says. Those with other interests can advance them before their elected representatives. The Constitution, he says, does not guarantee perfect government, only representative democracy.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
81. Brest, Rights, supra note 12, at 1090.
82. Id.; see also Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983). But see Berger, Mark Tushnet's Critique
of Interpretivism, 51 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 532 (1983).
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Some of the criticisms aimed at Berger also apply to Robert Bork,
particularly Ely's point concerning historic versus contemporary majoritarianism. Bork, like Berger, looks to the text of the Constitution and
its authors for understanding, but he also requires the values he finds to
be expressed through neutral principles. 83 Bork differs from Wechsler,
however, in that he has defined the source of those principles.
For Bork, the theory is all important. The Court's power, he says,
is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned opinions that
it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective
spheres of majority and minority freedom. If it does not have such a
theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or worse if it pretends
to have a theory but actually follows its own predilections, the Court
violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifies its
power."
Among the dangers that Bork sees in noninterpretivism are expanding judicial power to the detriment of democratic choice, judicial
balancing of created rights akin to lawmaking, nationalization of moral
values, and gentrification of the Constitution. "
In application, how does Bork's neutral principles of interpretivism
work? He has provided several examples, including the first amendment "6 and welfare rights.87 The former, according to Bork, is limited
to political discourse88 under the Constitution, and the latter do not
exist in the Constitution at all. 9 He reaches these results by first examining the text. As to the first amendment, it is exceedingly broad on its
face.9 0 However, by looking next to the history and structure of the

83. See Bork, First Amendment, supra note 7, at 14-15.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Bork, supra note 13, at 1138.
86. Bork, First Amendment. supra note 7.
87. Bork, Welfare Rights. supra note 7.
88. Bork, First Amendment, supra note 7, at 24-26. Bork says the right to political discourse could be inferred from the rest of the Constitution, even if the first amendment were absent. Id. at 23. Thus, Bork's theory renders the first amendment at best redundant. Arguably,
though, the comment undercuts the theory, for if the Framers were concerned only with what was
obvious, they need not have specified it as the first amendment in a Bill of Rights. Moreover, if all
they were concerned about was political speech, they certainly did a terrible job of limiting their
language.
89. Bork expressed this view in response to Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. REV. 659.
90. On the off chance that some reader may reach for his dog-eared copy of the Constitution to remind himself of the exact language of the first amendment, it states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
Bork's approach to constitutional interpretation envisions a dichotomy between what he calls
specified rights-those discerned from the text and from history-and individual rights, which he
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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document, he concludes that the Framers did not mean no law. Their

concern, rather, was with facilitating self-government, not self-expression. 91 Consequently, speech about politics is protected, but nude danc92
ing is not.
The argument does not end there, however. Bork goes on to re-

strict even political speech. The government, he says, may prohibit and
punish exhortations aimed at its destruction. Bork finds the justification for this restriction in the existence and structure of the Constitution. The nation has no duty, he insists, to tolerate the musings of those
who would destroy its very tolerance." The assertion is debatable on its
merits-where is the tolerance to which Bork alludes if the speech is
not to be tolerated? What is more important for this discussion,
though, is the process by which he reached his conclusion.
The language of the first amendment is all-encompassing: "no
law." It is perhaps the least qualified exposition in the entire document.
calls secondary. The latter, he says, result from governmental processes established by the Constitution. They are not for the benefit of individuals, he says, but rather for the benefit of the governmental process that the Constitution outlines. Thus, one would suppose, when such a right appears
to be dysfunctional, it can be abridged in Bork's system. This theory, though, must rely on a
restrictive reading of the ninth amendment, a reading that not all commentators share. See, e.g.,
C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981).

91. Bork, First Amendment, supra note 7, at 24-26. Bork disputes Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), which stated that speech has four
benefits protected by the Constitution: (1) developing an individual's faculties; (2) deriving happiness from engaging in the activity; (3) providing a safety valve; and (4) aiding the discovery and
spread of political truth. Bork, First Amendment, supra note 7, at 24-25. Suffice it to say that
Bork is in the minority on this point. Thomas Emerson identifies four protected values: (1) assuring self-fulfillment; (2) advancing knowledge and discovering truth; (3) providing for participation
in decision making by all members of society; and (4) achieving a more adaptable and a more
stable community while maintaining the balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus. T.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7

(1970). Vincent Blasi finds an-

other feature of the first amendment: a checking value. Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521. Martin Redish reduces the amendment's function to one "true value"--"individual self-realization." All the others, he believes, are
subsumed under this rubric. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593-94
(1982). Redish admits, however, that his argument is based on "reasoning from what I take to be
widely held premises." Id. at 595 n.27.
92. Bork, First Amendment, supra note 7, at 20. See New York State Liquor Auth. v.
Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981). The Court concluded that the state could ban nude and seminude
entertainment, but it justified this restraint on the basis of the state's power to regulate places
where alcohol is sold. But see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), in which
the Court ruled that nude dancing is not without some first amendment protection and that a
zoning ordinance regulating such live entertainment was not a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation.
93.
94.

Bork, First Amendment, supra note 7, at 25-26, 29-30.
Id. at 31. Bork says that such speech does not qualify as political speech because it is

about a minority seizing power when it cannot gain power by speech and political activity. Thus,
he says, it breaks the premise of our system as to how truth is defined. Id.
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Yet, Bork cannot accept Hugo Black absolutism.9 5 He "knows" that
the Framers meant something less encompassing. He "knows" this
through a lifetime of study of the law and constitutional history. He
rejects mechanical jurisprudence because he "knows" better. At this
point, however, he allows subjectivity. The only question is at what
level will it be expressed?
Bork has chosen to look backward to the historical intention of the
Framers. If he were concerned about pure majoritarianism, he might
better look at current concepts of the first amendment. Doubtless his
academic career affects his appreciation for the historical method of
defining law. A less-schooled individual might be more inclined toward
a current consensus approach. Moreover, his preference for stability
underscores his reliance on history. One whose social stature in society
is not so high might well be less impressed with the existing order.
Bork's anarchy distinction is particularly revealing. He imputes a qualification on political speech to the authors despite the fact that they had
formed their nation by revolution.90 Using the neutral principles approach, one finds that Bork has defined the principle in a less than
neutral manner. He has explained his abridgment, but his adherence to
objectivity seems wounded.
Bork's search is for the core of the constitutional idea. Yet, the
core is not the whole apple. Political speech undoubtedly was paramount in the thoughts of the Framers, but they also had other matters
on their minds. Subjectivity enters his system at what Brest calls the
level of abstraction.9 7 What is the proper principle: total freedom of

95. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), Justice Black expressed his idea of the
scope of the first amendment: "I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that
there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who
drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field." Id. at 61
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black often was joined by Justice Douglas in this contention; however, both often found themselves concurring or dissenting.
96. The Declaration of Independence, although admittedly a document of emotion rather
than law, nonetheless provides some insight into the Framers' attitudes toward antigovernment
speech and activity. Having just given birth to a nation by revolution, the Framers did not rule out
the possibility that revolution would be required once again. After stating their fundamental rights
of equality, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, they said:
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; . . . . But when a
long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design
to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.
The Declaration of Independence, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
97. Brest, Rights, supra note 12, at 1091.
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speech, freedom of nonobscene speech (laying aside the inherently subjective problem of defining obscenity), freedom of political speech, freedom of nonseditious political speech, freedom of nonrevolutionary political speech? The choice inevitably requires judges to act upon their
own values. How they look for the answer may provide sufficient subjectivity to determine the outcome. Bork's ideal is a noble one, but it
also is one that cannot achieve the goals he has set for it.
As has been stated, Bork relied on Herbert Wechsler's theory of
neutral principles to form part of his own approach to judicial review.
Wechsler devised the theory in the 1950's, yet he did not apply it as
rigidly as Bork would. 98 Wechsler was willing to allow the justices to
consider their own value judgments. 9 However, he was not willing to
allow them to do so for expediency. 00 Louis Pollak and others sounded
a similar theme.10 ' Whatever the nomenclature, the central idea was
designed to prevent ad hoc decision making. Judges would be compelled to apply the principle to all species of cases, and "[i]f it sometimes hurts," as Bickel explained the theory, "nothing is better proof of
its validity."' 2
Wechsler's proposal proved useful, as far as it went, but it did not
go far enough. Neutral principles described how the principles should
be applied, but did not tell how they should be derived. As Greenwalt
has pointed out, neutral principles does not mean "that judges can be
neutral among values, either in the obviously wrong sense that they can
avoid value choices, or in the debatable sense that they should strive
neutrally to draw all their value judgments from the legal materials."' 0 While Wechsler would not allow judges simply to impose their
own values in place of those of the Constitution, he would allow, indeed
would expect, judges to use their wits to identify such constitutional
principles. Greenwalt has written that judges may even act on intuition
and remain in harmony with Wechsler's theory, as long as their intuition is confirmed by neutral principles.' "
98. See H.

WECHSLER,

supra note 5.

99. See Greenwalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
982, 991 (1978).
100. Under Wechsler's system, justices could act upon their own strongly held principles, so
long as they acted consistently. Greenwalt writes that judges need not even treat all relevant
groups similarly. For example, they may decide that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause applies only to discrimination against blacks. As a result, their reading of the clause would
favor one group but would be perfectly consistent with neutrality in Wechsler's sense. Id. at 992.
101. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). See also Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959) (principles should be impersonal and durable).
102. A. BIcKEL, supra note 11, at 59.
103. Greenwalt, supra note 99, at 992.
104. Id. at 991. See also Greenwalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest
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The "principles" theory has provided the fodder for much of the
subsequent literature on judicial review, although many theorists place
less importance on the neutrality aspect that was so important to
Wechsler. Harry Wellington, for example, grounds his theory of review
on principles derived from conventional morality,1 05 which is an objective inquiry to Wellington. As if to reassure his readers, he underscores
his belief that the Court must assert our moral views, rather than its
moral views.10 Thus, judicial review proceeds in the same manner as
judicial interpretation of documents. 0
Wellington's thesis, of course, depends on the existence of some
common notion of morality, and he insists that it does exist, despite the
diversity of American society. What he calls the "subculture problem,"
tends to be a difference of policies rather than principles. 108 Policies in
his system are utilitarian choices of lesser stature than principles.1 0 9
They are in the realm of politics rather than morality. Conventional
morality, on the other hand, is found in the American people's "history
and tradition which interact with their common problems to fashion
attitudes, values, and aspirations that tend toward a dynamic, but nev110
ertheless relatively cohesive, society."
Wellington may be correct when stating that some consensus does
exist on broad morality. Whether a consensus that broad can contrib-

for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975).
105. Wellington, Rules, supra note 10, at 243. Ronald Dworkin espouses a related, albeit
more complex, theory of judicial review. It is a theory that shares attributes of Wellington's principle jurisprudence, Ely's representation reinforcing approach, and fundamental rights assertions.
Dworkin believes that the Court should make decisions of principle rather than policy, just as
Wellington does. Principles in Dworkin's system, however, are derived from a root principle that
government must treat people as equals. See Dworkin, supra note 9, at 516. Based on the existence of this "equal concern and respect," disadvantaged citizens have a claim of right against the
government when the challenged law embodies "external preferences"-preferences about the allocation of resources to others-as opposed to "personal preferences"--allocation of resources to
oneself. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 272-78 (1977).
106. Wellington, Rules, supra note 10, at 244. Wellington's argument is based on the thesis
that a moral point of view does exist and that by reasoning from it, one can discern principles of
justice. Later in the article, Wellington suggests that the view of the American Law Institute is
some evidence of society's moral position on abortion, id. at 311, which is rather like saying the
Aspen Institute provides some evidence of society's political position. The model codes produced
by the American Law Institute are not restatements; they are recommendations of elite groups of
thinkers. Undoubtedly, the contributors are highly intelligent and their ideas are well-intended,
but they hardly can be said to represent a cross section of American society.
107. Id. Wellington devotes the first half of his article to developing a distinction between
principles and policies for common-law adjudication. Id. at 222-64. Then, he adapts this same
mode of decision making to Supreme Court review. Id. at 265-311.
108. Id. at 245.
109. As examples, Wellington says the contract duty to perform or pay damages is based on
a policy of efficiency. The rule of tort law making intentional infliction of physical harm illegal, in
contrast, is based on a principle of a strong duty. Id. at 231-32.
110. Id. at 245.
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ute to judicial interpretation of the Constitution, however, is another
matter. Assume that a principle of equality exists in this country.
Would that principle help decide whether the state must subsidize poor
school districts to eliminate the disparity in per capita student expenditures between those poor districts and rich districts?11 1 Does it tell the
Court whether school districts must educate children of undocumented
alien workers? 1" Because of its breadth, Wellington's concept says almost nothing about how problems should be decided. The value-neutral
search eventually becomes value-laden, for in order to discover "principles" sufficiently precise to decide cases, judges are led to finding principles based on their personal backgrounds. Except in the easiest cases,
the principles are not "'out there' waiting to be discovered."'I s They
exist in the expectation of the one looking for them.
For the moment, though, let us give Wellington the benefit of the
doubt and assume that such principles do exist "out there.""' Does he
have an objective, indeed a scientific, means of discovering them? Wellington's method calls for the judge to live in society, to "become sensitive to it, experience widely, read extensively, and ruminate, reflect,
and analyze situations that seem to call moral obligations into play.""'
This "method of philosophy" 6 is not the method of most judges, and
it hardly is free from value judgments.
The propensity of judges to experience widely tends to be tempered by the necessity to spend their working hours in the courthouse.
Judges, judicial clerks, and lawyers do not exhaust the variations of
human beings that society has produced. Nor do they represent the
spectrum of socioeconomic statuses. Even if justices were disposed toward experiencing widely, they would likely experience with other
judges of their acquaintance. Justice Brandeis once tried to convince
Justice Holmes at least to develop a greater appreciation for the facts
of a case. Brandeis suggested that reading "books could carry him only

11. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973), in which
the Court ruled that equal education is not a fundamental right.
112. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in which the Court ruled that school districts
must enroll such students. See generally Comment, Equal Protection and the Education of Undocumented Children, 34 Sw. L.J. 1229 (1981).
113. See J. ELY, supra note 1, at 48.
114. Wellington, Rules, supra note 10, at 246. But see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921):
The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course
and pass the judges by. We like to figure ourselves the processes of justice as coldly objective and impersonal. The law, conceived of as a real existence, dwelling apart and alone,
speaks, through the voices of priests and ministers, the words which they have no choice
except to utter.
115. Wellington, Rules, supra note 10, at 246.
116. Id.

Published by eCommons, 1984

58

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:1

so far" and that Holmes might, for example, acquire some exposure to
the textile industry during his vacation. 1 7 Brandeis, while a glutton for
facts, still recognized that his vision was impeded by his position. As
Bickel observed, justices are restrained from normal consultation. They
are restrained to reading."
Reading may be a window to the world,
but it remains the tool of an outsider looking in. By relying on judges to
read and experience widely, Wellington is overestimating their time
and intentions and unwittingly encouraging a class-bound
jurisprudence.
Moreover, a judge's reading and experiencing is colored by what is
known as selective perception.11 9 Krech and Crutchfield provide an example of Americans and Mexicans watching a bullfight. The Americans, because of their cultural background, may focus on the cruelty
inflicted on the bull. The Mexicans, in contrast, concentrate on the skill
of the bullfighters and perhaps the spirit of the bull in continuing the
fight.1 20 In the case of conventional morality, an upper-class justice of
the Supreme Court may see certain societal activities as indicative of a
principle while the justice's secretary may view the evidence quite differently. What you see depends on what you have seen before.
Courts do not need empirical research to ferret out the principles
of American society, according to Wellington. Their insulation and reason make them better suited to the task.' In so stating, Wellington
confuses his theory. One is uncertain whether Wellington is a "principles" theorist or a "reason" theorist, or both. He is most likely both.
His approach seems to be that principles are to be discovered by means
of rational investigation and reflection. Yet, both of these methods are
highly susceptible to injection of the judge's own principles.
Wellington acknowledges the inevitability of mistake, but discounts its importance, relying upon feedback from the community to
tell the justices when they are wrong.' 2 2 "Remember," he counsels, "it
is the moral ideals of the community and not of the wise philosopher
that concern the Court. And it is a wise court that pays attention to the
community-not out of fear, but out of obligation.' 2 3 Having eschewed empirical research as a means of finding the community's

117.

A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS

230 (1957).

118. Id. at xviii.
119. See Krech & Crutchfield, Perceiving the World, in PROCESS & EFFECTS OF MASS
COMMUNICATION 235, 248 (W. Schramm & D. Roberts eds. 1971); Katz & Feldman, The Debates in the Light of Research: A Survey of Surveys, in PROCESS & EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION,

120.
121.
122.
123.

id. at 701, 730-31.
Krech & Crutchfield, supra note 119, at 248.
See Wellington, Rules, supra note 10, at 247.
Wellington, Nature. supra note 10, at 514-16, 519.
Id. at 516.
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moral consensus (and isn't this a value judgment in itself?), Wellington
then is left with the idea that the justices of the Supreme Court are
able to discern public opinion better than the pollsters. The pollsters
certainly are not perfect, but at least their methods are less valueladen. 1 " Feedback eventually may convince the Court it read the public's morality wrong, depending on which feedback the justices pay attention to and how they read it, but it does not overturn the wrong
decision. For that, society must wait for another case or controversy. In
the meantime, the law remains in effect.
Benjamin Cardozo may well be considered the intellectual progenitor of Wellington, at least insofar as judicial review is concerned. Cardozo, however, wrestled openly with the class-bound self. Objective
standards, he says, are an ideal that is never attained. "We cannot
transcend the limitations of the ego," he wrote, "and see anything as it
really is. '' 12 5 "Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and
dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts
and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man,
whether he be litigant or judge."12
Having said that, Cardozo proceeded to interject a subjective ele-

ment in the very definition of the objective process. The judge's search,
he said, is for "the customary morality of right-minded men and
women . . .."17 Yet, who is right-minded? If a majority opposes capital punishment as a species of cruel and unusual punishment, how is
the judge to decide whether this morality is right-minded? The search

for consensus becomes hopelessly subjective when it becomes a quest
for the opinions of the right-minded majority. Cardozo admitted as
much, quoting James Harvey Robinson:

124. Sociologist Louis Wirth acknowledges that social scientists, despite their best efforts,
allow their predispositions to color their work by their hypotheses and conclusions, their organization of materials, their methods of investigation, and their selection of data. Wirth, Preface to K.
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE XX

(L. Wirth & E. Shils trans. 1936). One hundred and fifty years ago, Story cautioned against
courts attempting to intuit the public's opinion.
It is one thing to believe a doctrine universally admitted, because we ourselves think it
clear; and quite another thing to establish the fact. . . .If public opinion is to decide
constitutional questions, instead of the public functionaries of the government in their deliberate discussions and judgments, (a course quite novel in the annals of jurisprudence), it
would be desirable to have some mode of ascertaining it in a satisfactory, and conclusive
form; and some uniform test of it, independent of mere private conjectures. . . .Human
nature never yet presented the extraordinary spectacle of all minds, agreeing in all things;
nay not in all truths, moral, political, civil, or religious.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1289, at 167-68 n.2
(1833), quoted in J. ELY, supra note 1, at 216 n.100.
125. B. CARDOZO, supra note 52, at 106.
126. Id. at 167.
Id. at 106. 1984
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Our beliefs and opinions . . . like our standards of conduct come to us
insensibly as products of our companionship with our fellow men, not as
results of our personal experience and the inferences we individually
make from our own observations. We are constantly misled by our extraordinary faculty of 'rationalizing'-that is, of devising plausible arguments for accepting what is imposed upon us by the traditions of the
group to which we belong. 28

Nonetheless, the job must be done, and Cardozo, like Wellington,
considered the judge the right person to do it. Wellington expresses
confidence in the insulation of the position from pressure. 129 Cardozo
based his confidence on judicial training and temperament.130 Mistakes
will be made, both Cardozo and Wellington admit, but both would
likely agree with Zechariah Chafee, who wrote that although law may
become the "will of the justices," it is "the will of the justices trying to
do that which is right."''
Alexander Bickel resembled Cardozo in the sense that both men
expressed a deep faith in some special ability of judges to discern society's morality. "Judges have, or should have," Bickel wrote, "the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar

in pursuing the ends of government."'" 2 The remark is pregnant with
self-revelation. Bickel patently assumed that the scholarly approach

would lead to the information he sought, an assumption grounded in his
career as an academic. Moreover, he suggested that judges have hours
upon hours to reflect upon the questions of our time, while in fact, long
delays because of crowded dockets are the reality.

3

Additionally, he

128. Robinson, The Still Small Voice of the Herd, 32 POL. Sci. Q. 312, 315 (1917),
quoted in B. CARDOZO, supra note 52, at 175.
129. Wellington insists that courts are better suited to this task than legislatures because of
their insulation from political pressure and interest group politics. "Reason, not Power" is the
slogan he says he would hang over the door of the institution charged with finding society's moral
principles. Wellington, Rules, supra note 10, at 246-47.
130. B. CARDOZO, supra note 52, at 176.
131. Chafee, Do Judges Make or Discover Law?, 91 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 405, 420
(1947), quoted in A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 236.
132. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 25-26.
133. For many years, Chief Justice Burger has been concerned about the number of cases
filed in the Supreme Court. Burger has predicted that without drastic changes, the American
system of justice "may literally break down before the end of this century." Burger Says Growing
Caseloads May Break Down the U.S. System of Justice, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at BI, col.
1. Burger noted that the number of cases before the Court has more than tripled in the past 29
years to more than 4,400, and the number of written opinions has more than doubled. Id. In the
1983-84 term the Court disposed of 180 cases by signed and per curiam opinions. Statistical
Recap of Supreme Court's Workload during Last Three Terms, 53 U.S.L.W. 3028 (1984).
The Chief Justice is not the only member of the Court to call for a remedy to the crowded
docket. Several of the justices now support the creation of a National Court of Appeals, a proposal
that was made in 1975 but which received little support at the time. See Cutler, Help for High
Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1982, at A19, col. 2.
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professed faith in judicial training, but if anything, such training separates judges from the common currents of society. They are undoubtedly insulated, but does that really help them discover the country's
moral consensus or does it simply insulate them from attack for unpopular decisions?
Bickel's approach to judicial review diverges from those of Car-

dozo, Wellington, Dworkin, and other "principle" theorists in a remarkable way. He not only believed that judges should seek out fundamental principles, he believed they should also look backward and
forward. The judge in Bickel's system is a sort of soothsayer, declaring
as law "those principles as will-in time, but in a rather immediate
foreseeable future-gain general assent. ' " Upon closer inspection one
finds that Bickel was not looking for a current consensus at all. The
Court, he said, is an educator of public opinion, a leader rather than a
mere register.13 5
Thus, Bickel envisioned a Court creating a consensus by its decisions, creating in effect a self-fulfilling prophecy. He offered a paradoxical explanation: "The Court," he said, "must lead opinion, not merely
impose its own." 15 The clause is enticing poetry, but it is not a state-

134. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 239. Bickel, however, admitted that "the most fundamental of one man's fundamental presuppositions, most ideally arrived at, will not always be another's." Id. at 238. The problem was resolved to his satisfaction, though, by the existence of a
nine-member Court. To the extent that the nine share similar backgrounds, however, nine is not
much better than one. Besides that, why nine? If a larger number renders better results, why not
535-the number of Congressmen and Senators?
135. Id. at 26, 239. Raoul Berger disputes the notion that society should look to the courts
for leadership in resolving problems Congress has failed to solve. During the time of the constitutional convention, he says, the Court's role was considered a defensive one: preventing Congress
from absorbing all power. R. BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 339. Charles Black retorts that
the preponderance of the evidence indicates that a majority of delegates at the convention understood that courts would review legislation on constitutional grounds. To support his argument, he
cites § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 87, which expressly provides for review of state
court decisions by the Supreme Court.
136. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 239. Leopold Pospisil, a professor of anthropology, calls

this acceptance the process of internalization. L. PospislL,

ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW:

A

COMPAR-

192-232 (1974). Decisions of courts, he says, may begin as authoritarian laws,
those simply decreed without widespread support in society, but a variety of social pressures push
to transform them into customary laws, those that are internalized by a majority. Private internalization (psychological) over time eventually leads to societal internalization. The process is not
inevitable, but the momentum is strong. Id. at 193-97. Pospisil observes that people can be convinced to internalize even the most hated ideas. He cites as an example Bruno Bettelheim's study
of Nazi concentration camp inmates, who internalized the attitudes of their captors and began to
imitate them. Id. at 199. Some of the prisoners, when put in charge of the others, behaved even
worse than their captors. Id. at 204. Pospisil corroborates Bettelheim's account with the recollections of his (Pospisil's) father, who saw for himself how some prisoners changed their appearance
to resemble the SS jailers and even sewed uniforms for themselves that looked like those of the
guards. Id.
Theby
conclusion
Pospisil
draws is that "authority can break down 'entrenched' customs and
Published
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ment that can aid the justices in finding some external manifestation of
morality. If the justices are not to implement existing sentiment on morality, but are to lead it, and if the Court is obligated to succeed, then
it has no choice but to impose its own opinion of what it can convince
people to accept. The image of a Court peering into the future is an
attractive one, but Bickel revealed the true nature of his system with
the last part of his description-the obligation to succeed. If the future
were predetermined, the obligation to succeed would be a non sequitur;
it would be akin to saying that a physicist has an obligation to succeed
in making an object fall to earth. Therefore, Bickel's insistence on success displays the real consequence of his Court: imposition of principles
that the justices think ought to be fundamental.
Indeed, the Court does have the ability to change public opinion
by the fact of its reaching a particular decision. 3a After Roe v.
Wade,18 8 for example, attitudes toward abortion became more liberal.18 9 Bickel attempted to use his system to justify a Supreme Court
decision outlawing capital punishment even though the public has historically supported the death penalty and continues to do so. 14 0 If the
Court were to impose a ban on capital punishment, it would not be

cultural norms and replace them by new laws and values, given enough time, inducement (rewards
and punishment), and isolation of the subjects from contrary influences." Id. Obviously, complete
isolation is impossible in the United States. Nonetheless, if victims of Nazi oppression can come to
accept the ideas of their tormentors, surely the American people can be moved to accept most of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. See also Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 38 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 417, 447-48 (1943).
137. Bickel acknowledged that the Court may well control public opinion over time by reducing the question and "rendering the answer familiar if not obvious." A. BICKEL, supra note 11,
at 240. The outcome, he said, results in great part from a colloquy between the Court and social
institutions, especially the practicing and teaching members of the bar. Id. In so stating, Bickel
unwittingly underscored the argument of Ely, Bork, and other critics that decision making by
judges tends to emphasize values that the status group finds important. Bork spoke of this contention in a 1982 meeting of the Federalist Society at Yale:
The Court responds to the press and law school faculties. The personnel of the media are
heavily left-liberal. Their values are quite egalitarian and permissive. Law school faculties
tend to have the same politics and values. So if there are new constitutional values they will
be the values of that class.
Federal Judge Assails Supreme Court Rulings, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1982, at A17, col. 6.
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. See Arney & Treacher, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion, 1972-1975, 8 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 117 (1976). See also T. SMtTH, A COMPENDIUM OF TRENDS ON GENERAL SOCIAL
SURVEY QUESTIONS 1-5 (1979) (GSS Technical Report No. 15) [hereinafter cited as GSS 15].
140. In 1982, 74% of a representative sample of American adults expressed support for the
death penalty for persons convicted of murder. GSS, supra note 18, at 87 (1982) (variable 79). As
'early as 1953, the number in favor amounted to 64%. In fact since 1953, the only time in which
less than a majority supported capital punishment was the mid-1960's, the period during which
Bickel's book appeared, and in 1971. Forty-five percent favored it in 1965; 42% in 1966. By 1967,
however, the figure had risen again to 55%. From 1973 on, support has never dropped below 60%.
GSS 15, supra note 139, at 18-19.
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because of widely shared principles, but rather because of a minority
view of morality. In time the public might come to accept that view,
but the acceptance would result from the authoritativeness of the decision of the Court, not from a wellspring of public sentiment. Abolishing
the death penalty might be the right thing to do, but disguising the
reason for the ruling hardly is. The Court may be the "shaper and
prophet of the opinion that will prevail and endure, ' 14 1 but its prophecy
is based on its confidence in its shaping ability.
Archibald Cox holds a view similar to that of Bickel. "The Court,"
he says, "must know us better than we know ourselves. 1 42 Thus he
alludes to heeding the will of the people in some sense, but like Bickel,
Cardozo, and Wellington, he principally posits a system in which the
justices' values are destined to be expressed. Cox, however, is somewhat
more honest about this. While he indulges in a certain amount of poetry about Supreme Court opinions being the "voice of the spirit, reminding us of our better selves," '48 he confesses that the Court need
not always heed the will of the majority. In fact, he provides an example in which it clearly did not: abortion.1 44 The laws of at least forty
states were swept away by Roe v. Wade, he writes, along with centuryold majority American moral themes. Substituted for this common notion of morality was "what seven justices took to be the wiser view of
'' 5
an actively debated question. 14
Cox is willing to defend the decision. The opinions of the Court, he
says, need not reflect the dominant public opinion of the moment; they
need only be rooted in ideas having some support in the nation, ideas
that the community eventually will avow and live by. 14 One is led to
wonder whether this formula imposes any restraint at all, for Americans can be found who support everything from abolition of all laws to
imposition of a fascist state. It would be a quixotic Court that could not
find some support for its opinion in society.
As for predicting the future consensus, Cox acknowledges the tautology: the Court must decide what the people will accept, but the
Court largely determines what the people accept by what it decides.14 '
Nevertheless, he writes that such judicial legislation is acceptable, at
141. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 239.
142. A. Cox, supra note 74, at 117.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 102.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 117-18.
147. Like Bickel, Cox admits that the Court plays an important role in shaping public opinion. This function is a matter of legitimacy to Cox, a legitimacy that rests upon the Court's ability
to discern what the community will live by and to influence that consensus by the decisions it
renders. by
Id. eCommons, 1984
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least for now. "[M]odern government is simply too large and too re-

mote, and too few issues are fought out in elections, for a citizen to feel
much more sense of participation in the legislative process than the
judicial." 14' That being the case, he does not lament the activist intervention of the Supreme Court, for149it does not lessen his sense of being

involved in a common adventure.
Of course, Cox himself has not been left out of the adventure. To
the contrary, he has been one of the guides as an advocate before the
Court and as an academician. The Court responds to entreaties coming
from people like him. The justices read what he has to say. Archibald
Cox does indeed have more influence with the Supreme Court than he
does by voting. Yet that is not the case with most Americans. For
them, elections are the means of making their views known and codified into law. The Supreme Court may well be justified in overturning
the will of the people in many instances, but the increasing remoteness
of the other two branches can scarcely be said to be the reason why, at
least not for those with less stature than Archibald Cox.
Unlike Wellington, Cardozo, Bickel, Dworkin, Cox, and Michael
Perry, 150 Laurence Tribe is not at all concerned about the public's morality. In his system, the Court is bound to enforce rights of selfhood.
These rights exist apart from and regardless of any community consensus about them. Thus, Tribe gives broad meaning of self-expression to
the first amendment.' 5a For example, he believes in constitutional protection for homosexual activity. 5" What worries Tribe is not judicial
activism in defining rights of selfhood but rather public resistance to
judicial creativity. The mission of the Court is not to protect its credi-

148. Id. at 116.
149. Id. Cox is reacting to Learned Hand's comments reproduced at supra text accompanying note 65.
150. Perry has been a principles theorist somewhat like Wellington except for the fact that
the benchmark for Perry is moral ideals, whereas for Wellington moral principles are the standard. See Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and beyond) Recent Cases,
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417 (1977). See the critique of Perry's view in Brest, Rights, supra note 12, at
1071-73. Perry recently has modified his position to resemble that of Charles Black. He now
believes that congressional power over the Court's jurisdiction is a sufficient majoritarian check to
justify judicial review. Perry, supra note 54, at 331. See generally M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
151. L. TRaE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-79 (1978). Tribe approvingly quotes
the concurrence of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men
free to develop their faculties . . . . They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty
L. TRE, supra, at 578.
152. Tribe places homosexuality under the rubric of "Rights of Privacy and Personhood."
L. TIBE, supra note 151, at 941-46.
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bility, he says, but rather "'to form a more perfect Union' between
right and rights within [the Constitution's] necessarily evolutionary design."' 58 "I prefer postulates honestly expressed," he writes, "to analyses whose underlying assumptions are obscured by the jargon of neutral
principles and the language of 'objective' legal description."'"
Full disclosure also is the recommendation of Miller and Howell in
an article entitled The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication.1 5 5 Choices among values are unavoidable, they contend."" When
the choices are made, they emanate from the biography and heredity of
a particular judge. They believe the Supreme Court should boldly become an active participant in government, furthering the democratic
ideal and disclosing the bases of its decisions. 57
The importance of an individual justice's values in the rights theories is undisputable. Tribe, Miller and Howell, and others like them do
not hide that fact. Tribe confesses to liking the Burger Court's activism
far less than that of the Warren Court; nonetheless, he does not seek a
return to restraint. 5 8 If they ire not worried about elitism in their systems, though, John Hart Ely certainly is.
Ely devotes a full chapter of his book Democracy and Distrust'5 9
to deflating the modes of noninterpretivist judicial review, finding them
all hopelessly tethered to judges' elitist ideals and high status. For example, he regards "reason" as an unreasonable source of constitutional
values. Either it is as empty as "neutral principles" or it is "flagrantly
elitist."'10 "Our society did not make the constitutional decision to
move to near-universal suffrage only to turn around and have superimposed on popular decisions the values of first-rate lawyers," Ely
states. e6
Fundamental values of society suffer similar criticism at Ely's
hands. They are infinitely manipulable, Ely believes, by those charged
with finding them. He writes:
[T]he list of values the Court and the commentators have tended to en-

153. Id. at iv.
154. Id. at v.
155. Miller & Howell, supra note 40, at 691. See also Braden, The Search for Objectivity
in ConstitutionalLaw, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 594 (1948).
156. Miller & Howell, supra note 40, at 671.
157. Id. at 689-91.
158. L. TRIBE, supra note 151, at v.
159. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 43-72.
160. Id. at 59.
161. Id. Ely quotes Robert Dahl as saying that "[a]fter nearly twenty-five centuries, almost
the only people who seem to be convinced of the advantages of being ruled by philosopher-kings
are ... a few philosophers." R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (3d ed. 1976),
quoted in J. ELY, supra note 1, at 206 n.75.
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shrine as fundamental is a list with which readers of this book will have
little trouble identifying: expression, association, education, academic
freedom, the privacy of the home, personal autonomy, even the right not
to be locked in a stereotypically female sex role and supported by one's
husband. But watch most fundamental-rights theorists start edging toor housing: those are
ward the door when someone mentions jobs, food,
1 2
important, sure, but they aren't fundamental.
Consensus theories also fail to pass muster according to Ely. First,
he attacks the elementary assumption that a consensus exists. A growing body of literature, he says, indicates that it does not, or that if it
may seem to exist, it is simply a function of the domination of some
groups by others. 168 Then, he questions the mode of assessment. How
can one determine whether the public deems a particular right to be
fundamental or simply important? Finally, he notes, if consensus is the
goal, the legislature is better suited to scoring it.1 The features that
Bickel and others extol, insulation and isolation, make the courts much
less suited to reflecting majority will. Legislatures may not be wholly
democratic, he argues, but courts certainly are not more democratic
than legislatures. 166 What is more likely to happen, Ely says, is that
judges-either consciously or subconsciously-will find their own values in the majority and thus consider themselves justified in imposing
them on society. 1 "
Having rebuked others for injecting their own value preferences,
Ely proceeds to present a theory that injects his own. It is a theory of
process orientation. Ely bases this selection on the theme of the Constitution, but the music is as much his theme as that of the document.
Reviewing Ely's book, Samuel Estreicher observed that the Constitution contains many other values. What Ely has done, he says, is simply
pick his favorite. Other options, such as preferred status of state and
local decision making, are equally plausible, Estreicher writes. 167 Indeed, he notes Bork's view that if one were looking for an implicit prin162. J. ELY, supra note 1,at 59. But see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
US. 1 (1973) and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in which the Court held that education is
not a fundamental right, although it is something more than a mere privilege. See generally
Levin, Commentary-Education as a Constitutional Entitlement: A Proposed Judicial Standard
for Determining How Much Is Enough, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 703.
163. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 63.
164. Id. at 67.
165. Id. Wellington argues that these countermajoritarian aspects of the legislature and
other elements of government have value precisely because of their countermajoritarianism. Thus,
he says, judicial review is not at all anomalous in the American system of government. Wellington, Nature, supra note 10, at 488-92.
166. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 67.
167. Estreicher, PlatonicGuardiansof Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme
Court In the Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 569 (1981).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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ciple of the Constitution, separation of powers and judicial restraint
would be a likely candidate. 1
In spite of all this, Ely calls himself an interpretivist, albeit not one
of the clause-bound persuasion. He does agree with Berger, Bork, and
the others that the language of the Constitution is the most important
factor in discerning its meaning. 169 Nonetheless, he says, the inquiry
cannot stop there because the intent of the Framers exists not clause by
clause, but rather within the document as a whole.17 0 That is the genesis of his exegesis of process reinforcement as the general theme of the
Constitution. In that sense, it may be interpretivism, but by enshrining
that particular aspect of the Constitution in a paramount position, Ely
moves toward the fundamental rights camp. His theory may not exhibit
the smell of the lamp, but it at least exudes the fragrance of a liberal.
Two more commentators merit attention at the end of this discussion, not because their views are any less telling than the others, but
rather because they believe the entire debate to be misplaced. Paul
Brest argues that all theories of judicial review self-destruct.171 Charles
Black asserts that the people knowingly created and continue to support a judicial check on themselves. 1 7 1
Brest's position is that the tension between majority and minority,
between legislature and court, merely mirrors the "essential and irreconcilable tension between self and other, between self and self 'l -in
other words-the human predicament. Continuing the debate in the
usual terms, he says, deflects attention from the more important endeavor: working "toward a genuine reconstitution of society-perhaps
one in which the concept of freedom includes citizen participation in
the community's public discourse and responsibility to shape its values
and structure." 1 '7 Thus, he writes, the proper measure of constitutional
decision making should be how well the practice (1) fosters democratic
government, (2) protects the individual from arbitrary and intrusive
government action, (3) encourages stable political order while remaining responsive to changed conditions, (4) discourages abuse and arbitrariness, and (5) endears itself to the populace.17 5 Obviously, Brest's
concepts do almost nothing to limit judges from translating their values
into law. Indeed, they seem to invite judges to do just that.
168. Bork, Welfare Rights, supra note 7, at 699.
169. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 16.
170. Id. at 12.
171. Brest, Rights, supra note 12, at 1096.
172. C. BLACK, supra note 14, at 105.
173. Brest, Rights, supra note 12, at 1108.
174. Id. at 1109.
175. Brest, Quest, supra note 12, at 226. Original intent, in Brest's theory, is relevant to
deciding by
constitutional
questions,
Published
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Charles Black provides a structural justification for judicial activism. The people, he says, have themselves created an institution
designed to check their own excesses and guard rights that might be
lost in the sometimes rowdy world of representational politics."" Far
from denying the role of the subjective judge, Black shudders at the
thought of a Court which is compelled to follow an act of Congress that
obliged it to sentence a man to death, even though the judge solemnly
believed the statute to be unconstitutional . 77 This judicial self-assertiveness, he writes, not only is acceptable, it is what the people want,
for if they wished to bridle the Court they could vote for representatives who would restrict its jurisdiction. Black writes:
I think that the people have said to the Court, through history, "We
have placed you where you sit not to decide whether your job is one that
ought to have been given you, but to do that one job. In worrying about
us, you badly mistake the position. If we really do not want you where
you are any more, we will take care of the matter; you need not trouble
your head about it. Meanwhile, we have put you there because we want
you to check our other representatives in certain ways; why else in the
we put up with you. Play this part with firmness
world do you suppose
8
and courage."'
The writers reviewed herein provide an array of defenses of various forms of judicial review. Some believe that the background of the
judge inevitably will be expressed, and that the judge should act honestly with that knowledge. Others purport to restrain the judiciary by
grounding their inquiry in public consensus or prediction of public consensus. These theories, however, have been shown in fact to involve
judgments substantially colored by the judge's self. Even the theories of
the interpretivists, who actively fight against activism, have been shown
to involve subjective judgments. The conclusion is that self-involvement
is unavoidable in all the systems. To the extent that the selves involved
are products of elite social strata, their decisions are likely to reflect the

176. C. BLACK, supra note 14, at 105.
177. Id. at 21-22. Black does not deny the influence of the judge's background in rlsolving
a constitutional case. To the contrary:
[T]he very nature of the material we call "law," of the material we look to when we look
for "law," and of the methods we use in this search for right "law," are such that they very
often make it not merely possible but inevitable that the beliefs and even the feelings of
the judge go into the making of judgment. This is true because the whole body of "law,"
separate from those beliefs and feelings-even if fully known and handled with the highest
expertness-very often does not suffice to lead the mind, by scientific or logical manipulations, to an unequivocally established right result, and must in the nature of things fail to
do this.
C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 20 (1981) (emphasis in original).
178. C. BLACK, supra note 14, at 107.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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beliefs of those groups. That is the proposition to be tested in the next
part of this article.
IV.
A.

EMPIRICAL DATA AND ANALYSIS

Methodology

The hypothesis of this study is that Supreme Court opinions will
tend to reflect the views of high-status members of society. To test that
assertion, I have analyzed public opinion data collected by the National
Opinion Research Center in its General Social Surveys. 1 9 The surveys
included a number of questions on issues that subsequently were decided by the Court in addition to some that the Court had already
ruled upon. Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences computer program,180 I have cross-tabulated answers to the questions with
various indices of status, specifically: occupational prestige, 181 education, income, and subjective estimation of class. The issues to be discussed are: confidence in the Supreme Court, removal of books from
libraries, abortion, capital punishment, busing, and obscenity.16 2 Several other issues will be discussed in a summary fashion.
B. Confidence in the Court
If the Supreme Court tends to reflect the opinion of those with
high status, it would be logical to predict that such people would express greater confidence in the Court. The data from the General Social Surveys confirm that prediction. The question was asked: "As far
as the people running these institutions [several were asked about, including the Supreme Court] are concerned, would you say that you
have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any
confidence at all in them?" In 1976, 52% of those with the highest
prestige occupations expressed a great deal of confidence in the Court.
In all other prestige categories, only about 36% were so supportive. In
contrast, 14.1% of the lowest occupational prestige group said they had
hardly any confidence in the Court while only 7.9% of the highest
group responded with this negative view. In 1978, the responses clus179.

J. DAVIS,

GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS,

1972-1982 (machine readable data file). Princi-

pal investigator, James A. Davis; senior study director, Tom W. Smith; research assistant, C.
Bruce Stephenson. NORC ed. Chicago: National Opinion Research center producer, 1982; Storrs,
CT: Roper Public Opinion Research Center, University of Connecticut distributor. One data file
(13626 logical records and one codebook (398 pages)). All data reported herein were generated
from these surveys.
180. See N. HIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BRErr, STATISTICAL
PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(2d ed. 1975).

181. The lowest prestige rating encountered was a nine; the highest was 82 (a list of many
occupations and their ratings is on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
182. The questions are reproduced in the Appendix.
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tered closer together with greater numbers choosing the middle response--only some confidence; however, differences remained.
Table 1 Confidence in Supreme Court by Occupational Prestige, 1976

Prestige
Score

Confidence

Great deal

Only some

Hardly any

ROW TOTAL

9-19

95
37.1%

125
48.8%

36
14.1%

256
18.2%

20-39

193
35.2%

255
46.5%

100
18.2%

548
38.9%

40-59

174
36.6%

219
46%

83
17.4%

476
33.8%

51
40.2%

10
7.9%

9%

650
46.2%

229
16.3%

1407
100%

60-82

COLUMN
TOTAL

528
37.5%

127

(NOTE: Prestige increases as score increases)
7
x'-1 .35406 df-6 p=.0081
Missing observations (unemployed, retired, no answer, don't know)=92

A correlation between education and support for the Court also is
borne out by the data. Both the 1976 and the 1978 studies revealed a
strong relationship. In 1978, confidence in the Court increased as each
category of education increased. Thus, only 24.5% of those with less
than a high school education said they had great confidence in the
Court. Among high school graduates, the number increased to 27.7%.
Thirty-nine percent of the persons with junior college educations reported great confidence in the Court, as did 42.7% of those with bachelor's degrees, and 45.9% of respondents with graduate degrees. Negative responses were in the opposite direction. Only 8.2% of the graduate
school-educated individuals said they had almost no confidence in the
Court. This percentage rose among those with less than a high school
education.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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Confidence in Supreme Court by Educational Degree, 1978

Degree

Confidence

Confidence
Great deal

Only some

Hardly any

ROW TOTAL

< High School

103
24.5%

237
56.3%

81
19.2%

421
28.9%

High School

217
27.7%

447
57.2%

118
15.1%

782
53.7%

Jr. College

16
39%

20
48.8%

5
12.2%

41
2.8%

Bachelor

64
42.7%

73
48.7%

13
8.7%

150
10.3%

Graduate

28
45.9%

28
45.9%

5
8.2%

61
4.2%

COLUMN
TOTAL

428
29.4%

805
55.3%

222
15.3%

1455
100%

x'=34.07454 df-8 p<.0001
Missing observations =77

None of the data on income proved to be statistically significant
with regard to confidence in the Supreme Court; however, people's subjective impression of their social class proved to be a fair predictor. In
1978, as class status increased, the number expressing great confidence
in the Court tended to increase and the number expressing almost no
confidence decreased. The data from 1976 shows a similar relationship
among those who have great confidence in the Court; however, the pattern in the negative responses is not at all clear. One quarter of the
upper class said they had hardly any confidence in the Court-the largest negative rating in any class category. Indeed, the middle class
proved to be the least critical and most supportive in 1976. Unfortunately, the 1980 results were not statistically significant, so it is difficult
to say whether the negative ratings of 1976 were the norm or an aberration. In any event, positive evaluations of the justices appear to be
generally correlated with class. Additionally, it is correct to say that
since 1976, the trend has been toward the center-some support-and
away from the extremes.
Published by eCommons,
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Confidence in Supreme Court by Subjective Class, 1976
Confidence

Class

Great deal

Only some

Hardly any

ROW TOTAL

Lower

17
27.4%

35
56.5%

10
16.1%

62
4.4%

Working

212
33.2%

305
47.7%

122
19.1%

639
45.6%

Middle

289
42.4%

301
44.2%

91
13.4%

681
48.6%

Upper

8
40%

7
35%

5
25%

20
1.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

526
37.5%

648
46.2%

228
16.3%

1402
100%

x'=19.79428 df=6 p-.00
Missing observations=97
Table 4

3

Confidence in Supreme Court by Subjective Class, 1978
Confidence

Class

Great deal

Only some

Hardly any

ROW TOTAL

Lower

19
25.7%

42
56.8%

13
17.6%

74
5.1%

Working

174
25.4%

397
57.9%

115
16.8%

686
47.2%

Middle

223
33.9%

346
52.6%

89
13.5%

658
45.3%

Upper

13
36.1%

19
52.8%

4
11.1%

36
2.5%

COLUMN
TOTAL

429
29.5%

804
55.3%

221
15.2%

1454
100%

3 4
9
df=6 p-.0 0
x'=13.9300
Missing observations-78

Table 5

Confidence in Supreme Court

Confidence

Year
1976

1978

1980

1982

Great deal

528
38%

429
29%

361
26%

459
32%

Only some

650
46%

806
56%

734
53%

798
55%

Hardly any

229
16%

223
15%

286
21%

187
13%
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While subjective notions of class are not perfect predictors of support for the Court, subjective notions of one's political power are quite
reliable. The 1978 General Social Survey included two questions on
alienation. The first called for a response to the statement "The people
running the country don't really care what happens to you." The second sought a response to the statement that "people in Washington,
D.C. are out of touch with the rest of the country." More than 21% of
those who agreed with the first statement expressed hardly any confidence ini the justices as compared with only 8.5% who disagreed. Curiously, the number of alienated people who rated the Court negatively
was almost exactly balanced with alienated people who gave it a great
deal of !support-21.5%. Those who thought their leaders did care,
however , were much more likely to have confidence in the Court-39%.
Additionally, those people who believed that their national leaders were
in touch with the rest of the country were more confident in the Court.
Table 6

Confidence in Supreme Court by "People Running Country Don't Care," 1978

Yes or no

Confidence
Great deal

Only some

Hardly any

ROW TOTAL

Yes, feel
don't care

160
21.5%

424
57.1%

159
21.4%

743
53.1%

No

256
39%

345
52.5%

56
8.5%

657
46.9%

COLUMN
TOTAL

416
29.7%

769
54.9%

215
15.4%

1400
100%

x'=74.61241 df=2 p<.0001
Missing observations= 132
Table 7

Confidence in Supreme Court by "People in D.C. out of Touch," 1978

Yes or no

Confidence
Great deal

Only some

Hardly any

ROW TOTAL

Yes, feel
out of touch

181
22%

470
57.2%

171
20.8%

822
60%

No

223
40.6%

286
52.1%

40
7.3%

549
40%

COLUMN
TOTAL

404
29.5%

756
55.1%

211
15.4%

1371
100%

x2 =79.26289

df=2

p<.0001

Missing by
observations=
161 1984
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C. Libraries
In Board of Education v. Pico18e a plurality of the Supreme Court
recently held that "local school boards may not remove books from library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those
books."l" By so deciding, the Court overturned a summary judgment
in favor of a board that had purged "'[a]nti-American, anti-Christian,
anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy' " 85 books from a high school and
junior high school. School boards certainly retain some powers of selectivity, the Court said, but the justification for the selection must not
interfere with the first amendment rights of the students.
One might expect better-educated individuals to support diversity
of libraries. It is undoubtedly the sort of value associated with "the
smell of the lamp. ' ' l e Responses to questions on the General Social
Surveys reveal that that is precisely the case: the greater the education,
occupational prestige, social status, and income, the greater the support
for "open stacks." The Supreme Court's decision was consonant with
public opinion, but it was the public opinion of society's elites.
In 1980, interviewers asked whether the books of someone against
all churches and religion ought to be removed from the public library.
The differences in answers of occupational prestige groups was dramatic. More than 84% of those in the highest category opposed the
removal of the books. In contrast, more than half of the people in the
lowest category wanted the books taken off the shelves. The number
favoring removal varied inversely with prestige, while opposition to removal increased directly with prestige.

183.

457 U.S. 853 (1982).

184. Id. at 872. Four justices agreed on that proposition. A fifth, Justice White, concurred
on the ground that a summary judgment had been issued improperly in the case because a genuine issue of material fact-why the books were removed-remained unresolved. Thus, he saw no
reason to "issue a dissertation" on the first amendment. Id. at 883. (White, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 857. A recent survey of librarians in 860 school systems revealed that Go Ask
Alice, a diary of a teenager who committed suicide after a period of drug abuse, is the most
frequently censored book in high school libraries. Researchers also found that the percentage of
communities in which challenges occurred had increased since 1977, and in more than half of
those cases, some form of censorship ultimately resulted. See Librarians Say 'Go Ask Alice' Is
Censored Most in Schools, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, § 1, at 73, col. 2.
186. See supra text accompanying note 1.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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Table 8
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Removal of Atheist's Book in Library by Occupational Prestige, 1980

Prestige
Score

Removal or not

Remove

20-39

40-59

60-82

COLUMN
TOTAL

Not remove

ROW TOTAL

226
15.8%

117

109

51.8%

48.2%

225
42.1%

309
57.9%

534

160
29.1%

390
70.9%

550
38.5%

19
15.8%

101
84.2%

8.4%

521
36.4%

909
63.6%

37.3%

120

1430
100%

x'-65.23911

df=3 p<.0001
Missing observations= 38

Similarly, the level of one's education has proven to be an important predictor of tolerance of atheistic literature. More than 97% of
those with graduate school degrees, 89% of those with bachelors degrees, and 81% of those with junior college degrees opposed removing
the books. Among people with less than a high school education, however, 62% favored removing the books.
Interestingly, high school appeared to inspire a pronounced increase in tolerance. The percentage opposing removal increased by
more than 30% in the jump from the group with less than a high school
education to that with a high school diploma. Thus, every educational
group, except for that composed of people who did not finish high
school, opposed the removal of an atheist's book from the public library. Nonetheless, opposition was significantly stronger in the collegeeducated
sector. 1984
Published
by eCommons,
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Table 9 Removal of Atheist's Book in Library by Educational Degree, 1980
Dearee
Degree

Remove or not
Remove

Not remove

< High School

270
62.5%

162
37.5%

High School

222
30.7%

501
69.3%

ROW TOTAL
432
30.3%
723
50.7%

Jr. College

8
18.2%

36
81.8%

44
3.1%

Bachelor

17
10.8%

141
89.2%

158

Graduate

2
2.9%

67
97.1%

11.1%
69
4.8%

COLUMN
TOTAL

519
36.4%

907
63.6%

1426
100%

x2=221.88629 df=4 p<.0001
Missing observations =42

Tolerance also varied with income: the greater the income, the
more likely one was to oppose removal of the atheistic book. The same
held true for personal subjective identification of class, although it is
important to note that as with education, the breakpoint in the removal
versus nonremoval dichotomy came rather early. A majority of the
working class opposed book banning, yet even more of the middle and
upper class opposed it. Hence, the value of libraries open to antireligious viewpoints is not rigidly class-bound. Except for the very lowest
groups, it is class-bound only in degree.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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Removal of Atheist's Book in Library by Family Income, 1980
Remove or not
Remove

Not remove

ROW TOTAL

$0-3,999

63
51.6%

59
48.4%

122
9.2%

$4,0005,999

59
60.2%

39
39.8%

98
7.4%

$6,0007,999

47
45.6%

56
54.4%

103
7.8%

$8,00014,999

114
40.7%

166
59.3%

280
21.1%

$15,00019,999

68
32.2%

143
67.8%

211
15.9%

$20,00024,999

53
27.9%

137
72.1%

190
14.3%

$25,000+

67
20.8%

255
79.2%

322
24.3%

COLUMN
TOTAL

471
35.5%

855
64.5%

1326
100%

xs=84.06194 df-6 p<.0001
Missing observations- 142
Table 11
Class

Removal of Atheist's Book in Library by Subjective Class, 1980
Remove or not
Remove

Not remove

ROW TOTAL

Lower

37
51.4%

35
48.6%

72
5.1%

Working

261
39.6%

398
60.4%

659
46.3%

Middle

206
32%

438
68%

644
45.2%

Upper

14
28.6%

35
71.4%

49
3.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

518
36.4%

906
63.6%

1424
100%

x'=16.62971 df=3 p=.0008
Missing observations -44

A question about banning the books of a self-avowed Communist
from the public library resulted in similar responses along the elitism
continuum in 1980. Only those in the lowest occupational prestige
group favored removing the book. The difference between that segment
and the highest one was striking: more than 80% of the latter opposed
the removal. Even in the two middle groups, the responses from cate-
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gory to category changed by about 10%. Occupational prestige, therefore, made a definite difference in attitudes on this question.
Table 12

Removal of Communist's Book in Library by Occupational Prestige, 1980

Prestige
Score

Remove or not
ROW TOTAL

116
55%

Not remove
95
45%

20-39

237
44.9%

291
55.1%

528
37.4%

40-59

195
35.3%

358
64.7%

553
39.2%

60-82

23
19.5%

95
80.5%

118
8.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

571
40.5%

839
59.5%

1410
100%

Remove

211
15%

x'=50.47466 df=3 p<.0OOl
Missing observations = 58

Tolerance of Communist literature also proved to be highly correlated with education, but again, high school emerged as the great liberalizer. About 65% of those who did not finish high school favored banning the book; about the same percentage of those who did complete
high school opposed such a ban. From that point on, more education
made a significant difference, but people with the least education were
left alone in favoring the removal of the book.
Table 13

Removal of Communist's Book in Library by Educational Degree, 1980

Remove or not

Degree

Remove

Not remove

ROW TOTAL

< High School

268
65.2%

143
34.8%

411
29.2%

High School

259
35.9%

462
64.1%

721
51.3%

Jr. College

13
28.9%

32
71.1%

45
3.2%

Bachelor

24
15.2%

134
84.8%

158
11.2%

Graduate

5
7%

66
93%

71
5%

COLUMN
TOTAL

569
40.5%

837
59.5%

1406
100%

x'=187.92929

df=4

P<.0001

Missing observations= 62
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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Income and class also turned out to be useful predictors of attitudes on political book banning; however, once family income reached
$6,000 a year (hardly a huge sum), people were unlikely to support the
ban. Moreover, a majority of no class, not even the lowest, favored removal of the book. The differences were in degree.
Table 14
Income

Communist's Book in Library by Family Income, 1980
Remove or not
Remove

Not remove

ROW TOTAL

$0-3,999

66
60%

46
40%

110
8.4%

$4,0005,999

56
59.6%

38
40.4%

94
7.2%

$6,0007,999

44
44.4%

55
55.6%

99
7.6%

$8,00014,999

121 .
43.7%

156
56.3%

277
21.2%

$15,00019,999

75
35.7%

135
64.3%

210
16.1%

$20,00024,999

70
36.6%

121
63.4%

191
14.6%

$25,000+

87
26.7%

239
73.3%

326
24.9%

COLUMN
TOTAL

519
39.7%

788
60.3%

1307
100%

xl=62.40231 df-6 p<.0001
Missing observations - 161
Table 15
Class

Communist's Book in Library by Subjective Class, 1980
Remove or not
Remove

Not remove

ROW TOTAL

Lower

29
46.8%

33
53.2%

62
4.4%

Working

288
44.3%

362
55.7%

650
46.3%

Middle

237
36.9%

406
63.1%

643
45.8%

Upper

15
30.6%

34
69.4%

49
3.5%

COLUMN
TOTAL

569
40.5%

835
59.5%

1404
100%

x'-10.44737 df-3 p<.02
Missing observations-64
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In summary, then, the value of open libraries supported by the
recent Supreme Court decision is correlated with occupational prestige,
education, income, and subjective sense of class. However, support for
this value is widespread, and increases on the elitism scale serve primarily to accentuate this attitude. In that sense, the decision is classbound, but the distinction primarily exists between those in the lowest
groups and everyone else. It should be noted, however, that the Court's
decision involved a school library while the survey questions asked
about a public library. Undoubtedly, they are quite similar; however,
responses to other questions suggest that the public as a whole is less
tolerant of diversity in the schools, even colleges and universities.
On the question of whether a Communist should be allowed to
teach in a college or university, the breakpoint was reached much later.
Only the most prestigious occupational group opposed firing such a person. In terms of education, not until the junior college level did respondents favor keeping such a person on, and then only by a slim majority.
The bachelor and graduate degree holders are the ones who gave the
idea strong support. Among income groups, only the very top
one-those making $20,000 or more---opposed firing a Communist college teacher, and then only by a small margin. One would expect attitudes toward instruction in high school and junior high school to be
even less tolerant. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Eddiucation v. Pico reflects the views of America's elites and, perhaps,
1 87
verges significantly from those in the middle of the spectrum.
D.

Abortion

The furor over the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wadeee
still has not abated, even eleven years after the fact. If anything, the
debate has intensified as the "pro life" and the "pro choice" rhetoric
revolves around a proposed human life amendment. In 1973, when the
Court handed down its decision in Roe, the right to receive an abortion
on demand during the first trimester and the somewhat minimal re-

187.

The findings are reminiscent of a previous study of public support for broad guarantees

of free speech compared with Supreme Court decisions. In that research, the author concluded
that the Court was more in tune with highly educated people. Such a correlation was not surprising, though, he said, because members of the Court are more likely to interact with highly educated people, both professionally and personally. Gaziano, Relationship between Public Opinion
and Supreme Court Decisions: Was Mr. Dooley Right?, 5 COM. RESEARCH 131, 147 (1978).
188. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court simultaneously struck down a number of procedural
impediments to abortion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Later cases included Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a statute requiring consent of the
father); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (involving consent of a minor girl's parents); and
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a statute that required the physician of a
minor girl to notify, if possible, her parents if an abortion is to be performed).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

1984]

strictions on abortion in the second trimester were very much the values of the upper socioeconomic and educational class.
The 1972 General Social Survey included a number of questions
about the circumstances under which a woman should be allowed to
obtain a legal abortion. Across the various categories of status, a majority supported abortion when a strong chance existed that the baby
would be born with a serious defect or when the mother's health was
seriously endangered. In other circumstances, however, status differences were quite apparent.
Only those in the highest prestige group were willing to allow an
abortion to a married woman who simply wanted no more children.
Educationally, only those with bachelors and graduate degrees endorsed abortion in this instance. Insofar as income was concerned, support for abortion by preference did not arise until about the top 20
percentile. And only those who considered themselves in the upper
class-less than 3% of the respondents-said they would allow a legal
abortion under these circumstances. The results were similar, although
slightly more supportive, when the question was whether an unmarried
woman who did not want to marry the father would be allowed to obtain an abortion.
Table 16

Abortion for No More Children by Occupational Prestige, 1972

Prestige

Yes or no

Score

9-19

Yes

No

ROW TOTAL

90

226

316

28.5%

71.5%

20.7%

213

345

558

38.2%

61.8%

36.5%

229

293

522 '

43.9%

56.1%

34.2%

75

57

132

56.8%

43.2%

8.6%

COLUMN

607

921

1528

TOTAL

39.7%

60.3%

100%

20-39

40-59

60-82

x'=37.09918

df=3

p<.0001

Missing observations=85

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

82
Table 17

[VOL. 10:1

Abortion for No More Children by Educational Degree, 1972

Degree

Yes or no
Yes

No

ROW TOTAL

< High School

157
26.1%

445
73.9%

602
39.9%

High School

321
44.5%

400
55.5%

721
47.8%

Jr. College

8
47.1%

9
52.9%

17
1.1%

Bachelor

72
61.5%

45
38.5%

117
7.8%

Graduate

38
74.5%

13
25.5%

51
3.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

596
39.5%

912
60.5%

1508
100%

x'-103.29961 df=4 p<.0001
Missing observations - 105
Table 18
Income

Abortion for No More Children by Family Income, 1972
Yes or no
Yes

No

ROW TOTAL

$0-3,999

73
26.8%

199
73.2%

272
19.4%

$4,0005,999

52
33.8%

102
66.2%

154
11%

$6,0007,999

58
38.2%

94
61.8%

152
10.8%

$8,00014,999

204
37.8%

335
62.2%

539
38.4%

$15,00019,999

84
52.8%

75
47.2%

159
11.3%

$20,00024,999

37
57.8%

27
42.2%

64
4.6%

$25,000+

40
62.5%

24
37.5%

64
4.6%

COLUMN
TOTAL

548
39%

856
61%

1404
100%

xl=56.17458 df=6 p<.0001
Missing observations- 209

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

1984]
Table 19

Abortion for Single Woman by Educational Degree, 1972

Degree

Yes or no

< High School

174
29.7%

412
70.3%

586
39.5%

High School

350
48.9%

366
51.1%

716
48.2%

Jr. College

8
50%

8
50%

16
1.1%

Bachelor

75
65.2%

40
34.8%

115
7.7%

Graduate

38
74.5%

13
25.5%.

51
3.4%

645
43.5%
p<.0001

839
56.5%

1484
100%

ROW TOTAL

COLUMN
TOTAL
x'=96.20978

df-4

Missing observations= 129
Table 20 Abortion for Single Woman by Subjective Class, 1972
Class

Yes or no
Yes

No

ROW TOTAL

Lower

18
19.1%

76
80.9%

94
6.3%

Working

279
39.4%

429
60.6%

708
47.3%

Middle

334
50.7%

325
49.3%

659
44%

Upper

22
61.1%

14
38.9%

36
2.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

653
43.6%

844
56.4%

1497
100%

x'=45.84438 df-3 p<.0001
Missing observations= 116

Some fascinating insights result from the question of whether a woman
from a low-income family that cannot afford any more children should
be able to obtain an abortion. The people with lowest incomes were the
least willing to allow an abortion in this case, even though they would
be the very people affected, and the people with the highest incomes
were the most supportive of abortion on these facts. Again, the
breakpoint occurred at about the top 20 percentile. Occupationally, educationally, and by class, the lowest groups were the least likely to support abortion for the poor, although the breakpoint for majority support
came near the middle of the spectrums rather than at the top. None-
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theless, support for abortions for the poor increased as occupational
prestige, education and social class increased.
Table 21

Abortion for Poor Woman by Family Income, 1972
Yes or no

Income

Yes

No

ROW TOTAL

$0-3,999

88
34.2%

169
65.8%

257
18.6%

$4,0005,999

62
42.2%

85
57.8%

147
10.6%

$6,0007,999

73
48%

79
52%

152
11%

$8,00014,999

272
49.9%

273
50.1%

545
39.4%

$15,00019,999

92
58.2%

66
41.8%

158
11.4%

$20,00024,999

42
65.6%

22
34.4%

64
4.6%

$25,000+

41
66.1%

21
33.9%

62
4.5%

670
48.4%
p<.0001

715
51.6%

1385
100%

COLUMN
TOTAL
x'=44.93188

df=6

Missing observations= 228

Although the controversy is far from over, one researcher studying
later GSS data found a dramatic increase in support for abortion after
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.18 9 In 1973's survey, 86%
said they had heard of the Court's abortion decision. Taken together,
these facts may well bear witness to the veracity of the view of Alexander Bickel and Archibald Cox: by making a decision, the Court not
only responds to public opinion and anticipates it, but also leads it, in
this case, in the direction of society's elites. It should have come as no
surprise, then, that the Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to
Roe and struck down most impediments to abortions within the Roe
guidelines. 1 0

189. See Arney & Treacher, supra note 139.
190. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983), the Court struck down local rules requiring a 24-hour waiting period after the patient
consented to the abortion, the presentation of extensive information about alternatives to abortion
as well as physical and emotional complications that might arise, and a ban on abortions for
minors without regard to their maturity. Similarly, in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103
S. Ct. 2517 (1983), the Court struck down a requirement that second trimester abortions be
performed in hospitals, although it upheld such a rule in Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532
(1983), when "hospital" was defined to include licensed outpatient clinics.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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Capital Punishment

In The Least DangerousBranch, Alexander Bickel built a theory
of judicial review and applied it to capital punishment. The time was
right, he said, for the Court to begin whittling away at the death penalty until nothing was left of it but historical recollection.19 1 As noted
earlier, support for capital punishment reached its perigee around the
time Bickel's book was published. 1 "1 That lowpoint, however, turned
out to be very much an anomaly.
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia,198 the Supreme Court
struck down the totally discretionary imposition of the death penalty.
The penalty was not intrinsically unconstitutional, however, because
four years later the Court upheld it when discretion was guided by objective standards.'"
The Court's decision to allow states to retain the death penalty
was grounded in approval cutting across all segments of society. In
1974, the year between Furman and the subsequent cases that upheld
capital punishment, attitudes toward the death penalty for persons convicted of murder were quite uniform. About 62% of the lowest occupational prestige group favored it, as did slightly more than 60% of the
highest group. Just over 60% of the lowest income group supported the
death penalty, and about 63% of the highest group did also.

191. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 240-43.
192. See supra note 140.
193. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
194. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion
Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1976). In the 1981 term, the Court struck down the use of the
death penalty for felony murder when the defendant was not the person who caused or sought to
cause by
theeCommons,
resulting death.
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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Table 22

Death Penalty by Occupational Prestige, 1974

Prestige
Score

Favor or oppose

[VOL.

10:1

Favor

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

9-19

149
62.6%

89
37.4%

238
17%

20-39

348
66.2%

178
33.8%

526
37.5%

40-59

341
70.7%

141
29.3%

482
34.3%

60-82

95
60.1%

63
39.9%

158
11.3%

COLUMN
TOTAL

933
66.5%

471
33.5%

1404
100%

x'=8.42412 df=3 p<.04
Missing observations- 80
Table 23
Income

Death Penalty by Family Income, 1974
Favor or oppose
Favor

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

$0-3,999

123
60.3%

81
39.7%

204
15.8%

$4,0005,999

78
64.5%

43
35.5%

121
9.4%

$6,0007,999

84
60.9%

54
39.1%

138
10.7%

$8,00014,999

281
67.1%

138
32.9%

419
32.4%

$15,00019,999

152
74.1%

53
25.9%

205
15.8%

$20,00024,999

74
76.3%

23
23.7%

97
7.5%

$25,000+

69
62.7%

41
37.3%

110
8.5%

COLUMN
TOTAL

861
66.5%

433
33.5%

1294
100%

x'=16.03906 df-6 p<.02
Missing observations = 190

Nevertheless, at least one revealing statistic remains and reinforces
the criticism of the Court as bound by the values of its own class.
Blacks did not support capital punishment, which should not be surprishttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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ing since they have been among the principal victims of it. 195 In 1974,
less than 40% of the black people surveyed said they were in favor of
the death penalty while almost 70% of the whites said they were. The
difference remained in the 1980 survey. Perhaps it should come as no
surprise that Justice Marshall consistently has stood opposed to the
death penalty but has been unable to convince more than a few other
members of the Court to join him at any time.'" As John Hart Ely
said, what is fundamental to one class may not be so to another.'"
Other indices of status may not reveal a distinction, but the race dichotomy seems to support the view that the Supreme Court remains
tied to a particular segment of society.
Table 24

Death Penalty by Race, 1974

Race

Favor or oppose
Favor

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

White

865
69.8%

375
30.2%

1240
88.3%

Black

63
39.9%

95
60.1%

158
11.3%

Other

5
83.3%

1
16.7%

6
0.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

933
66.5%

471
33.5%

1404
100%

xl 56.91360 df-2 p<.0001
Missing observations-80

F. Busing
In contrast to capital punishment, the Supreme Court has endorsed the preference of blacks for busing of school children over the
strong objection of whites. The Court's stand on busing has defied the
elitism model, which would have predicted that the Court would have
accepted the Reagan administration's argument against busing in the

195. In the period between 1930 and 1981, 53% of the victims of the death penalty were
black, but no blacks were executed between 1977 and 1981. BUREAU OF JuSTIcE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, at 9 (1982).
196. For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court struck
down a statute that made capital punishment mandatory, but only Justices Marshall and Brennan
based their decision on the belief that the death penalty violates the eighth amendment. Id. at
305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall and Brennan
stood alone again during the 1982 term in opposing capital punishment on eighth amendment
grounds. See, e.g., Ford v. Arkansas, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1022 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197.
See J. ELY, supra
Published
by eCommons,
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Nashville school case instead of denying certiorari. 198
Having diverged from public opinion on this issue, the Court has
refused to retreat. The Court defied widespread opposition of everyone
but blacks in 1971 when it endorsed busing as a remedy for segregated
schools in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,'9 9
and it did so again in 1977 by reiterating its support in Dayton Board
of Education v. Brinkman 0 0 In 1972, just after the Court's decision in
Swann, 55.2% of blacks favored racial busing, while 86.5% of the
whites opposed it. Opposition cut across all categories of occupational
prestige, education, income, and subjective notions of class both in
1972 and in 1976, the year before Brinkman. Consequently, busing has
been a major exception to the Court's favor for elitist views. In this
instance, the Court tried to lead, but few followed who were not already in line.
Table 25

Racial Busing by Race, 1972

Race

Favor or oppose

Favor
White

Black

Other

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

174

1116

1290

13.5%

86.5%

83.5%

138

112

250

55.2%

44.8%

16.2%

1

3

4

25%

75%

0.3%

COLUMN

313

1231

1544

TOTAL

20.3%

79.7%

100%

x'=225.48738

df=2

p<.0001

Missing observations=69

198. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Kelley, 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983). The Reagan administration had filed an amicus brief with the Court
that called for the abandonment of court-ordered busing when its "educational, social, and economic social costs" are unacceptably high. See AdministrationJoins Busing Appeal, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Nov. 16, 1982, § A, at 6, col. 2.
199.
200.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).

443 U.S. 526 (1979); see also Columbus
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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Racial Busing by Occupational Prestige, 1972

Prestige

Favor or oppose

Score
Favor

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

9-19

111
35.5%

202
64.5%

313
20.3%

20-39

106
18.6%

464
81.4%

570
36.9%

40-59

73
13.9%

452
86.1%

525
34%

60-82

23
16.9%

113
83.1%

136
8.8%

COLUMN
TOTAL

313
20.3%

1231
79.7%

1544
100%

xs'59.80055 df=3 p<.OO01
Missing observations-69
Table 27 Racial Busing by Educational Degree, 1976
Degree

Favor or oppose
Favor

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

< High School

101
19.7%

411
80.3%

512
35.2%

High School

94
13.3%

612
86.7%

706
48.6%

Jr. College

1
4.2%

23
95.8%

24
1.7%

Bachelor

18
12%

132
88%

150
10.3%

Graduate

20
32.8%

41
67.2%

61
4.2%

COLUMN
TOTAL

234
16.1%

1219
83.9%

1453
100%

x'-26.00586

df=4

p<.OO01

Missingbyobservations
=461984
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Racial Busing by Subjective Class, 1976

Class

Favor or oppose
Favor

Oppose

ROW TOTAL

Lower

20
31.7%

43
68.3%

63
4.3%

Working

120
17.9%

550
82.1%

670
46.2%

Middle

93
13.3%

604
86.7%

697
48%

Upper

2
9.5%

19
90.5%

21
1.4%

COLUMN
TOTAL

235
16.2%

1216
83.8%

1451
100%

x'-17.54367 df-3 p=.0005
Missing observations=48

G.

Obscenity

In 1973, the Supreme Court retreated from a laissez-faire approach to obscenity2 0 1 and adopted a tougher community standards ap2 02 Other
proach in Miller v. California.
decisions shielding minors re0
flected a true consensus of society.'
Public opinion on adult
regulation, however, is enigmatic.
In 1973, the year of the Miller decision, the General Social Survey
included the question of whether "pornography" should be subject to
laws restricting distribution to people of any age, to people under age
18, or not forbidden at all. On the educational scale, those with graduate degrees were the most tolerant of open distribution, yet only about
18% of them held that position. Among income groups, the greatest
support for full legality came from those in the next to the lowest category, and that only amounted to approximately 14%. The data from
1980's survey are similar.
At first glance, the surveys seem to indicate a broad consensus for
regulation; however, closer inspection casts doubt on that position. In
1973, for example, 43% of the respondents favored making obscenity
201. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
202. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
203. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982), the Court upheld a criminal statue prohibiting the promotion of materials depicting sexual performances by children. See generally Comment, Preying on Playgrounds: The
Sexploitation of Children in Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 809 (1978).
For a discussion of a statute similar to the one at issue in Ferber, see Comment, ChangingStandards of Obscenity in Texas, 34 Sw. L.J. 1201, 1221-24 (1981).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/4
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illegal to all; 48% said they would keep it away from teenagers, and
only 9% thought it ought to be available to all. The figures look as
though 91% favor regulation, but can be read another way.
The respondents were asked to choose the statement that most accurately described their point of view. Thus, it can reasonably be inferred that the largest group--the 48% that wanted to keep obscenity
away from children-did not want to keep it away from adults. If they
did, they would have chosen the first alternative-laws prohibiting its
distribution to all. Seen in this light, the 48% combined with the 9%
who wanted no laws at all to form a 57% majority against rigid obscenity regulation.
If such is the case, then the Miller decision contradicted public
opinion across the board. For example, on the education scale, more
than 52% of those who did not finish high school could be said to oppose regulation on adults, combining the two categories. By this means
of calculation, 71% of the people with graduate degrees opposed adult
regulation. A majority of the respondents in each income group also
opposed adult regulation.
Other questions both supported and undercut this interpretation.
For example, 66% agreed that looking at or reading "pornography"
provided information about sex. Sixty-one percent said that such sexual
materials provided an outlet for bottled-up impulses. On the other
hand, 56% thought sexual materials led to a breakdown of morals, and
54% thought they led people to commit rape. The 1980 survey revealed
similar contradictions. As a result, the one thing that can be said about
the Supreme Court's obscenity opinions is that insofar as they prevent
children from seeing sexual materials, they had the support of almost
all of society.
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"Pornography" Laws by Educational Degree, I973

Degree

Preferred law
Illegal to all

Illegal < 18

Legal

ROW TOTAL

< High School

254
47.7%

236
44.4%

42
7.9%

532
36.6%

High School

298
41.9%

344
48.4%

69
9.7%

711
48.9%

Jr. College

5
25%

12
60%

3
15%

20
1.4%

Bachelor

46
35.4%

73
56.2%

11
8.5%

130
8.9%

Graduate

18
29%

33
53.2%

11
17.7%

62
4.3%

COLUMN
TOTAL

621
42.7%

698
48%

136
9.3%

1455
100%

xl'20.09676 df=8 p-.01
Missing observations-49
Table 30 "Pornography" Laws by Family Income, 1973
Income

Preferred law
Illegal to all

Illegal < 18

Legal

ROW TOTAL

$0-3,999

93
42.1%

101
45.7%

27
12.2%

221
16.1%

$4,0005,999

71
48.3%

56
38.1%

20
13.6%

147
10.7%

$6,0007,999

58
40.8%

66
46.5%

18
12.7%

142
10.4%

$8,00014,999

222
45%

238
48.3%

33
6.7%

493
36%

$15,00019,999

67
38.3%

91
52%

17
9.7%

175
12.8%

$20,00024,999

34
33%

60
58.3%

9
8.7%

103
7.5%

$25,000+

31
34.8%

50
56.2%

8
9%

89
-6.5%

COLUMN
TOTAL

576
42%

662
48.3%

132
9.6%

xl'23.32588

df-12

p<.03

Missing observations- 134
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Table 31

"Pornography" Laws by Educational Degree, 1980

Degree

Preferred law
Illegal to all

Illegal < 18

Legal

ROW TOTAL

< High School

235
55%

172
40.3%

20
4.7%

427
29.8%

High School

269
36.5%

425
57.7%

42
5.7%

736
51.4%

Jr. College

17
38.6%

25
56.8%

2
4.5%

44
3.1%

Bachelor

43
27.7%

92
59.4%

20
12.9%

155
10.8%

Graduate

24
34.3%

40
57.1%

6
8.6%

70
4.9%

COLUMN
TOTAL

588
41.1%

754
52.7%

90
6.3%

1432
100%

x'=62.99989 df=8 p<.0001
Missing observations = 36
V.

CONCLUSION

Justices of the Supreme Court are products of their environment
just as all men and women are. As a result, the way they think about
problems, the concepts they bring to decision making, and the conclusions they reach are all shaped by their experiences. Expecting anything other than that is to expect human beings to shed their humanity
when they don their judicial robes. In fact, the robes merely cover the
man or woman justice. As a result, no theory of judicial review can
prevent a member of the Court from acting upon his or her own predilections. No matter which theory a justice adopts, substantive beliefs
are likely to be expressed in the end.
It is true that the Court, by and large, has consisted of people with
similar backgrounds, and recent empirical evidence seems to indicate
that the justices have transformed at least some of the preferences of
society's elites into law. Nonetheless, they have broken the bounds of
their backgrounds from time to time and rendered unexpected decisions-most notably on busing.
Thus, the hypothesis of class-bound determinism on the Supreme
Court is not one of strict determinism. On a particular issue of constitutionality, justices may be persuaded to vote against their subjective
views of the preferable policy. As a general matter, though, one should
expect members of the Court to act in conformity with the beliefs they
have formed over a lifetime. Such a course is a matter of direction, not
predestination. The resulting difference is neither uniformly liberal nor
conservative.
In some
cases, the high-status mentality secures rights for
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those of lower status that the lower-status groups do not support themselves. In other cases, the high-status justices are blind to rights others
consider fundamental.
Having said all this, I have not said whether I believe judicial selfassertedness is good or bad, whether it is justified or not. What I do
think is that it is inevitable, and that being the case the question of
justification becomes a non sequitur. A fully reasoned defense of
searching judicial review is beyond the scope of this article, although I
note in closing that I cast my vote for Charles Black's platform. Full
disclosure having been made, I ask only that members of the Supreme
Court do the same and do their best.
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DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGRAPHICS
APPENDIX
ATTITUDE QUESTIONS INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS

Social Class "If you were to use one of the four names for your
social class, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the
working class, the middle class, or the upper class?"
Confidence in Supreme Court "I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are
concerned, would you say that you have a great deal of confidence, only
some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? . . . U.S.
Supreme Court."
Alienation "Now I want to read you some things some people have
told us they have felt from time to time. Do you tend to feel or not...
the people running the country don't really care what happens to
you. . . .the people in Washington, D.C. are out of touch with the rest
of the country."
Atheist's Book "There are always some people whose ideas are
considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody
who is against all churches and religion. If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion
should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing
the book, or not?"
Atheist Teacher "Should such a person be allowed to teach in a
college or university, or not?"
Communist's Book "Now, I should like to ask you some questions
about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose he wrote a book
which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests
that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor
removing it, or not?"
Communist Teacher "Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should
he be fired, or not?"
Abortion "Please tell me whether or not you think it should be
possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if. . .there
is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby? . . .she is married
and does not want any more children? . . .the woman's own health is
seriously endangered by the pregnancy? . . .the family has a very low
income and cannot afford any more children? . . . she became pregnant as a result of rape? . . .she is not married and does not want to
marry the man?"
Capital Punishment (1972-1973) "Are you in favor of the death
penalty for persons convicted of murder?"
(1974-1982) "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?"
Busing "In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/
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Black) and white school children from one district to another?"
"Pornography"Laws "Which of these statements comes closest to
your feelings about pornography laws?
There should be laws against the distribution of pornography
whatever the age.
There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to
persons under 18.
There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of
pornography."
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